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ABSTRACT
The current study examined the role of co-worker support for safety within the
broader context of perceived safety climate predicting safety behavior and outcomes for
the mobile worker population of team truck drivers. Namely, the mediation, moderation,
and incremental direct effects of co-worker support for safety were tested. The current
study examined 366 team truck drivers from a single trucking company. Results indicated
that co-worker support for safety did not moderate the relationship between safety
climate perceptions and behavior and injury outcomes. However, co-worker support for
safety did partially mediate the relationship between safety climate perceptions and safety
behavior. Additionally, the model testing the 4-path mediation from organization-level
safety climate perceptions è

supervisor-level safety climate perceptions è co-worker

support for safety è employee safety behavior è crash outcomes was significant. In a
test of the incremental effects of co-worker support for safety, co-worker support was
found to explain an additional 7% of the variance in safety behavior beyond the
predictors of organization- and supervisor-level safety climate. Finally, tests of safety
behavior and crashes between solo and team truck drivers were not significant. However,
comparisons of the predicted outcomes at different levels of support did show differences
between the two groups, although not always in the expected direction. Overall, the
results show that co-worker support for safety is an important component in predicting
employee safety outcomes. Future safety interventions may find usefulness in assessing
and strengthening not only safety climate at the organization and supervisor level, but
also the safety supportive behaviors of employees themselves.

ii

DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my children.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank those people who have supported me during my graduate
career. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Tom Britt, for his support and
guidance on this and all projects we have work on together over the past five years. Your
direction has been invaluable to me. I would also like to thank my committee members,
Dr. Bob Sinclair, Dr. DeWayne Moore, and Dr. Emily Huang for their time and the many
suggestions they have provided me.
I would also like to thank the Liberty Mutual Research Institute for Safety,
specifically Dr. Emily Huang, Dr. Marvin Dainoff, and Dr. Ian Noy. Without their
support I would not have the opportunity to work on this project. Thank you.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support and
encouragement in earning my PhD. I would especially like to thank my husband, James. I
know you have sacrificed for me, and for you I am eternally grateful.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TITLE PAGE .................................................................................................................... i
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................... ii
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................. iv
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................viii
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
Variables Affecting the Impact of Safety Climate ................................... 3
The Current Study .................................................................................... 4
Dissertation Structure............................................................................... 8

II.

ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE ................................................................. 9
Safety Climate........................................................................................ 15
Safety Climate Outcomes ...................................................................... 20
Summary ................................................................................................ 24

III.

CO-WORKERS’ ROLE IN SAFETY: APPLICATION
FOR LONE AND MOBILE WORKERS.............................................. 25
Lone and Remote Workers .................................................................... 25
Psychological Safety Climate ................................................................ 27
Co-worker Support for Safety................................................................ 28
Social Support ........................................................................................ 28
Co-worker Support................................................................................. 31
Theories Supporting Co-worker Influence ............................................ 33
Co-workers and Safety........................................................................... 35
Summary ................................................................................................ 46

v

Table of Contents (Continued)
Page
IV.

HYPOTHESIS FORMATION AND RATIONALE ................................... 47

V.

METHOD .................................................................................................... 53
Participants................................................................................................... 53
Data Collection Procedure ........................................................................... 54
Measures ...................................................................................................... 55
Analysis Strategy ......................................................................................... 59

VI.

RESULTS .................................................................................................... 61
Descriptive Statistics.................................................................................... 61
Hypothesis Testing....................................................................................... 62
Summary ...................................................................................................... 73

V.

DISCUSSION .............................................................................................. 75
Discussion of Findings................................................................................. 75
Theoretical and Practical Implications......................................................... 84
Limitations and Future Directions ............................................................... 86
Conclusion ................................................................................................... 90

APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 92
A:
B:
C:

Measures of Safety Climate ......................................................................... 93
Measure of Co-Worker Support for Safety .................................................. 95
Measure of Safety Behavior......................................................................... 96

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 132

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page
1

Means, standard deviations, and correlations for Team
Truck Drivers ......................................................................................... 98

2

Means, standard deviations, and correlations for Solo
Truck Drivers ......................................................................................... 99

3

Model summary and parameter estimates for the interaction
between supervisor-level safety climate and co-worker
support predicting safety behavior ....................................................... 100

4

Model summary and parameter estimates for the interaction
between organization-level safety climate and co-worker
support predicting safety behavior ....................................................... 101

5

Parameter estimates of the interaction between organizationlevel safety climate and co-worker support for safety
predicting crashes in a logistic regression ........................................... 102

6

Parameter estimates of the interaction between supervisorlevel safety climate and co-worker support for safety
predicting crashes in a logistic regression ........................................... 103

7

Indirect effects and effect sizes or hypothesized path
models .................................................................................................. 104

8

Model summary and parameter estimates for 4-path
mediation analysis................................................................................ 105

9

Model summary and parameter estimates predicting safety
behavior................................................................................................ 107

10

Parameter estimates for driver type predicting safety
behavior................................................................................................ 109

11

Parameter estimates for driver type predicting crash
outcomes .............................................................................................. 110

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1

Base Model ................................................................................................ 112

2

Conceptual Model ...................................................................................... 113

3

Co-worker support for safety as a moderator of the
relationship between supervisor-level safety
climate and safety behavior ................................................................ 114

4

Co-worker support for safety as a partial mediator of the
relationship between supervisor-level safety climate
and safety behavior ............................................................................ 115

5

Co-worker support for safety as a moderator of the
relationship between organization-level safety
climate and safety behavior ................................................................ 116

6

Co-worker support for safety as a partial mediator of the
relationship between organization-level safety climate
and safety behavior ............................................................................ 117

7

Co-worker support for safety as moderator of the
relationship between organization-level safety climate
and crashes ........................................................................................... 118

8

Co-worker support for safety as partial mediator of the
relationship between organization-level safety climate
and crashes ........................................................................................... 119

9

Co-worker support for safety as moderator of the
relationship between supervisor-level safety climate
and crashes ........................................................................................... 120

10

Co-worker support for safety as a partial mediator of the
relationship between supervisor-level safety climate
and crashes ........................................................................................... 121

viii

List of Figures (Continued)
Figure

Page

11

The incremental effect of co-worker support for safety
beyond organization- and supervisor-level
safety climate ...................................................................................... 122

12

Model and unstandardized path coefficients for the mediation
effect of co-worker support for safety on the relationship
between supervisor-level safety climate and safety
behavior................................................................................................ 123

13

Model and unstandardized path coefficients for the mediation
effect of co-worker support for safety on the relationship
between organization-level safety climate and safety
behavior................................................................................................ 124

14

Model and unstandardized path coefficients for the mediation
effect of co-worker support for safety on the relationship
between organization-level safety climate and crash
outcomes .............................................................................................. 125

15

Model and unstandardized path coefficients for the mediation
effect of co-worker support for safety on the relationship
between supervisor-level safety climate and crash
outcomes .............................................................................................. 126

16

Model and unstandardized path coefficients for the mediation
effect of supervisor-level safety climate on the relationship
between organization-level safety climate and co-worker
support for safety ................................................................................. 127

17

Model and unstandardized path coefficients for the mediation
effect of supervisor-level safety climate on the relationship
between organization-level safety climate and safety
behavior................................................................................................ 128

18

Model and unstandardized path coefficients for the 3-path
mediation model linking organization-level safety
climate to safety behavior .................................................................... 129

ix

List of Figures (Continued)
Figure

Page

19

Four-path mediation model tested with PROCESS macro ........................ 130

20

Results of mediation analyses with PROCESS macro .............................. 131

x

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Globally, it is estimated that over 2.3 million deaths occur each year as the result
of occupational injuries and illnesses; that is roughly 6,300 deaths each day (ILO, 2013).
In the United States, there were 4,485 work-related fatalities in 2013 (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics [BLS], 2015) and over 3.0 million non-fatal workplace injuries (BLS,
2014). These statistics show an incidence rate of 3.3 non-fatal accidents per 100 full-time
workers annually. Therefore, examining the antecedents and determinants of safetyrelated behaviors should be a top priority in occupational research today.
The figures are striking and demonstrate how important safety is in any
organization, particularly those where the risk of injury to self or others is quite high.
However, it is important to note that these numbers may not be completely representative
of all accidents and injuries at work. For example, the BLS data only include full-time
workers and other studies have shown that significant under-reporting of accidents and
injuries may occur (Probst, Brubaker, & Barsotti, 2008).
Additionally, organizations continue to incur costs related to these workplace
injuries and accidents. The 2014 Liberty Mutual Safety Index (Liberty Mutual, 2015)
estimates that the direct U.S. workers compensation costs of the 10 most disabling
workplace injuries totaled $59.58 billion in 2012. However, indirect costs associated
with workplace injury (e.g., wages paid not covered by workers comp, lost productivity
related to hiring/training a new employee to fill in for the injured employee, lost time due
to work stoppage, administrative costs) are generally thought to be even greater than the
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direct costs. One study (Stanford, 1981) valued those indirect costs to be 1.1 – 4.5 times
the direct costs of the accident/injury. A more recent study directly asked corporate
financial decision makers to estimate the ratio of indirect to direct costs of employee
work-related injuries (Huang, Leamon, Courtney, Chen, & DeArmond, 2011). The
median response was a ratio of $2:1, indicating that corporate financial decision makers
expected to spend $2 in indirect costs for every $1 in direct costs for worker accidents.
These statistics show the monetary value of prioritizing worker safety.
Some of the first steps taken to improve worker safety involved changes to the
work environment and physical space where employees work, and researchers have
suggested that most of the accepted engineering approaches to safety have already been
implemented by companies (see Saari, 1990). However, an organizational and
psychosocial approach to worker safety is still an area where substantial outcomes can be
seen. Safety climate research is one such area that combines an organizational and
psychosocial approach to worker safety outcomes. Safety climate is a specific
organizational climate that reflects employee perceptions of the relative priority of safety
within a given organization (Huang, Zohar, Robertson, Garabet, Lee, & Murphy, 2013).
Safety climate has been studied in a variety of contexts and industries, including mining
(Griffin & Neal, 2000), healthcare (Neal & Griffin, 2006), military (Zohar & Luria,
2004), utility (Huang, Zohar, Robertson, Garabet, Murphy, & Lee, 2013), construction
(Goldenhar, Williams, & Swanson, 2003), trucking (Huang et al., 2013), manufacturing
(Zohar, 2002), and food production (Probst & Brubaker, 2001). Recent meta-analyses
have shown safety climate to be one of the strongest leading indicators of safety behavior
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both within a given work unit and across organizations (Beus, Payne, Bergman, &
Arthur, 2010; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Nahrgang, Morgeson, &
Hofmann, 2011).
Variables Affecting The Impact Of Safety Climate
Research directly examining variables that may affect how or when safety climate
impacts safety outcomes is a relatively new field. Zohar (2010) has recently called for an
increase in studies examining moderators and mediators of the safety climate-outcome
relationship. As the boundary conditions of the effect of safety climate are beginning to
be explored, the role co-workers play is an area that has yet to be systematically
integrated into safety climate research. Additionally, current research regarding the role
of co-workers is equivocal in whether co-workers are another dimension of safety climate
(Hayes, Perander, Smecko, & Trask, 1998; Lu & Shang, 2005; Neal, Griffin, & Hart,
2000) or a separate entity.
Social psychology has shown that the mere presence of others can affect behavior
(Zajonc, 1965). Findings that take on more importance when we consider that “others”
within the work environment (i.e., co-workers) may affect performance (Guerin & Innes,
1982). Research examining the context in which organizational phenomena occur has
been called for by both Rousseau and Fried (2001) and Johns (2006). Contextualization
in this case refers to taking into account, or studying directly, the “bigger picture.” Johns
(2006) notes that context can have such varied effects as shaping meaning, affecting
statistical range restriction, reversing signs in statistical relationships, or changing causal
direction. Rousseau and Fried (2001) argued that any research into organizational
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behavior requires contextualization because it can enhance the accuracy of models and
increase certainty in using those models to make predictions.
Johns (2006) refers to two types of context: omnibus context and discrete context.
Omnibus context refers to the macro-environment, such as location (including national
culture), occupation, the reason for the research project, and the temporal environment.
Discrete context can be thought of as the facet factors which, altogether, make up
omnibus context. The author breaks up discrete context into task context, social context,
and physical context. Johns notes that one way social context may have an effect is
through social “norms, communication, [and] persuasion” (p. 394). Johns submits that
important social context variables can be discerned by examining classic social
psychology research (e.g., the presence of social models). It can be argued that coworkers act as social models for employee behavior within the workplace.
The Current Study
The current study addressed gaps in the safety climate literature, specifically the
role of co-workers in determining safety performance and safety outcomes, particularly
for lone or mobile workers. The current study compared the direct (incremental),
moderating, and mediating effects of co-worker support for safety. Zohar (2010) called
for increased tests of the boundary conditions of the safety climate-safety outcome
relationship in order to test under what conditions the relationship is strongest or weakest.
This study contextualized the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes
through increased understanding of the role of co-workers as a moderator.
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The base model used in the current study is a three-path mediation model, linking
employee perceptions of safety climate at the organization level (OSC) to employee
perceptions of safety climate at the supervisor level (also called group-level safety
climate; GSC), employee safety behaviors, and employee accidents and injuries (see
Figure 1). While safety climate is itself a type of specific climate, it can be broken down
even further into organization-level safety climate (i.e., OSC) or group/supervisor-level
safety climate (i.e., GSC). While the term “level” is currently used with a popular type of
analysis (i.e., multi-level modeling), the safety climate literature uses the term “level” to
refer to a referent within a hierarchical organization. The current study remains consistent
with past research and operationalized organization-level safety climate to be safety
climate perceptions with the organization as the referent and supervisor-level safety
climate to be safety climate perceptions with the supervisor as the referent. A more
detailed discussion of safety climate takes place in Chapter 2.
The model in Figure 1 has received support for the individual relationships (i.e.,
organization-level perceptions predicting supervisor-level perceptions, see Zohar &
Luria, 2005; safety climate predicting safety behavior, see Clarke, 2006; and safety
behavior predicting accidents and injuries, see Christian et al., 2009) represented within
the model. However, the model has not been thoroughly examined to address the role of
co-workers. Figure 2 shows the full conceptual model used in the current study, including
the competing mediating and moderating effects of co-worker support for safety. Figures
3-10 show simple models which address different ways co-worker support for safety may
fit into the base model of Figure 1. From a hierarchical standpoint, co-workers may
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bridge the gap between management and employees behavior. Understanding what, if
any, influence co-workers have on employee behavior, particularly safety behavior, can
help researchers and practitioners design more effective interventions.
Co-worker support for safety, which is the degree to which employees perceive
their co-workers supporting workplace safety (Tucker, Chmiel, Turner, Hershcovis, &
Stride, 2008), is the co-worker related construct that was studied. The current project
tested how perceived co-worker support for safety functions in relation to the overarching model of safety climate. The effects of co-workers were examined as:
1. The mechanism through which safety climate produces outcomes (mediation
effect; see Figures 4, 6, 8, and 10).
2. The factor on which the magnitude of the relationship between safety climate and
safety behavior is dependent (moderation effect; see Figures 3, 5, 7, and 9).
3. Having an effect on safety outcomes above and beyond safety climate perceptions
at the organization and supervisor level (incremental effect; see Figure 11).
Additionally, this study contributes to the lone and mobile worker literature. It has
been hypothesized that lone workers constitute a unique population and relationships that
have been found to exist in other populations (e.g., traditional in-house employees) may
not function in the same ways with lone workers. For example, Huang and colleagues
(2013) found that truck drivers, considered a type of lone worker due to the fact that they
work away from a central office and have limited contact with their supervisors, do not
have shared perceptions of supervisor-level safety climate, a tenet often emphasized in
safety “climate” research (see Zohar & Luria, 2005).
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The current study assessed the role of co-workers in a specific truck driver
population: team drivers. Team drivers are truck drivers who drive with another driver in
the same vehicle. These teammates operate the truck sequentially so the truck
continuously runs and more miles can be driven. Generally, truck drivers are
compensated on a “pay by mile” system, meaning the number of miles driven (and not
time) is the main factor in salary. Additionally, it is a benefit to the driver if those miles
are driven in the shortest amount of time, thereby giving the driver the opportunity to take
on a new load, for which they are paid by the miles driven. However, Federal Department
of Transportation (DOT) safety regulations exist to limit the number of hours a trucker
can drive in a given day (i.e., can drive a maximum of 11 consecutive hours after a 10
hour break) or in a given week (i.e., cannot drive more than 60/70 hours in a 7/8 day
period unless a break of at least 34 hours has been taken; see Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration guidelines). Team drivers may have an advantage in that driver 2
can drive the truck while driver 1 takes the mandated rest period and vice versa, possibly
resulting in a lower incidence of driving incidents (Hanowski, Perez, & Dingus, 2005).
The role of such a teammate on safety outcomes has not been studied in the truck driving
safety climate literature.
In summary, the current study extended the literature through providing additional
tests of the mediating effect of supervisor-level safety climate perceptions. The safety
climate literature was also extended for the population of lone workers, specifically truck
drivers and team truck drivers. Additionally, and the main focus of the current study, the
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current study added to the literature in the area of the role co-workers play in employee
safety outcomes.
Dissertation Structure
The following chapters provide a review of the relevant literature as it pertains to
employee safety climate perceptions and how co-workers can impact safety outcomes.
Chapter 2 reviews the evolution of organizational climate from a broad construct to facet
specific climates and provide an overview of the safety climate literature, including
climate formation and safety-related outcomes. Chapter 3 focuses on the intersection of
lone and remote workers, co-workers, and safety outcomes. Hypothesis development is
constructed in Chapter 4. A discussion of the methods used to obtain the data for the
current study is found in Chapter 5, followed by the results of data analysis in Chapter 6,
and a discussion of the findings, along with implications and suggested applications, in
Chapter 7.

8

CHAPTER TWO
ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE
The organizational climate and culture literature is the basis on which more
specific climates, including safety climate, are founded. Schneider, Ehrhart, and Macey
(2013) describe culture and climate as constructs that allow those studying organizational
behavior to understand how people describe and experience their work. Organizational
climate is the shared beliefs and perceptions of employees within a given organization
(Schneider et al., 2011, 2013; Zohar & Hofmann, 2012). Organizational culture can be
described as the shared norms, values, and assumptions that set expectations for
acceptable behavior with an organization and are taught to new employees through
socialization (Zohar & Hofmann, 2012; Verbeke, Volgering, & Hessels, 1998).
Organizational climate can be seen as the manifestation of organizational culture.
Organizational culture has both deep and surface elements. Deep elements are the basic
values and assumptions that are ingrained and unquestioned, while the surface elements
include the manifestations of the deep elements (Zohar & Hofmann, 2012). Surface
elements, sometimes called artifacts, provide a bridge from the somewhat unobservable
deep elements of culture to the more observable and more accessible to measure elements
of organizational climate (Schein, 1990).
The concept of an overall, or molar, climate within an organization has been
studied extensively over the past few decades. This organizational climate can be
thought of an aggregation of individual perceptions across the organization in question.
In other words, climate is composed of the shared perceptions of the policies, procedures
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and practices within a given organization (Schneider et al., 2011). Policy can be thought
of as the goals an organization maintains. Procedure is the strategy implemented to
achieve these goals, and practice is the means through which procedure is implemented
(Zohar, 2003).
The early organizational climate research faced two problems. First, the issue of
at what level should and were data being collected and analyzed was a concern. In a
review of early climate research, Schneider et al. (2011) discussed how even though most
research focused on the organizational (and thus group) nature of the construct, most
studies were in fact conducted at the individual level of analysis. This issue was
somewhat resolved when James and Jones (1974) acknowledged that climate research
may also be measured and analyzed at the individual level, called psychological climate.
Second, an increasing number of dimensions were being added to the construct to
reflect the many perceptions employees could have about a given organization.
Researchers were then attempting to link the myriad dimensions of molar climate
perceptions with specific employee and organizational outcomes, leading to equivocal
findings (Zohar & Hofmann, 2012). Researchers (see Schneider, 1975) recognized that
the broad and general nature of most of the organizational climate measures meant that
they were ill-suited to predict specific outcomes. Schneider and colleagues (2011)
conceptualized the issue as one of “bandwidth and focus”, such that studies on the topic
would be strengthened if researchers reduced the dimensions of organizational climate
and focused specifically on the research question. That is, the predictive ability of
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organizational climate could be improved if the climate measures were tailored to the
outcomes of the research question.
Schneider (1975) was one of the first to recommend that the broad term
“organizational climate” instead be used as a climate in reference to something. If
climate is defined as relating to the policies, procedures, and practices within an
organization, then it is reasonable that an organization will have different policies,
procedures, and practices depending on the specific goals it is working toward and the
facets researchers intend to study (e.g., increasing innovation, decreasing on-the-job
accidents, increasing customer satisfaction). Researchers now call these “facet-specific
climates” (Zohar & Hofmann, 2012) or “strategic climates” (Schneider et al., 2011).
Strategic climates inform employees within a given organization of the types of behaviors
that are rewarded or supported and therefore, the behaviors in which the employees will
engage (Zohar & Hofmann, 2012).
In an overview of the issues relating to climate research, Zohar and Hofmann
(2012) described three models explaining the relationships between possible multiple
climates within an organization: independent, interactive, and causal. Specific climates
may be independent of one another, in that the effects of one climate do not affect a
second (or third, etc.) climate. One such example given by Zohar and Hofmann is the
model employed in a study by Baer and Frese (2003). In this study, the specific climates
of initiative (a “pro-active, self-starting, and persistent approach” to one’s job; Baer &
Frese, 2003, p. 48) and psychological safety (being able to express one’s self without
worry that it will bring retribution) were studied with respect to their effects on company
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performance. Analyses revealed that both climates have a significant impact on
performance outcomes such as return on assets. Interactive climate is conceptualized as a
statistical moderation model. That is, the effects of one climate on an outcome depend on
levels of a second climate or one climate influences a second climate. Zohar and
Hofmann propose that competing climates or domains will have an interactive effect. A
third model, the causal climates model, posits that some climates are more important and
impactful in determining organizational outcomes because they influence multiple other
climates. For example, Zohar and Hofmann mention work ownership climate (the extent
to which one sees aspects of work as part of their own identity) as being a causal climate
in that if work ownership climate is high and employees feel aspects of the job are part of
their identities, the climates for other important facets of the job (e.g., safety) will also be
high. It should be noted that although a classification system exists for types of climates,
very little research exists studying the effects can have on one another. Therefore, there is
not much evidence for which type a given climate may be.
Attempting to provide a categorization scheme for climates, Kuenzi and
Schminke (2009) noted four major groupings of organization-specific climates based on
the type of motivation a climate activates in order to produce the outcomes associated
with it. The authors note that climates can be focused on behavioral guidance (e.g.,
ethics, justice, and political climate), involvement (e.g., participation, support, and group
affect climates), development (innovation and training climates), and core operations
(e.g., service and safety climate). Safety climate and its related outcomes are a major
focus of the current study.
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The specific climate focused on organizational safety came about when Zohar
(1980) was among the first to put Schneider’s (1975) recommendations into practice.
Zohar constructed and validated a measure of organizational safety climate based on a
literature review of the major themes in the industrial safety literature. Zohar’s literature
review revealed multiple characteristics of safe organizations: management commitment
to safety, rank and status of the safety officer, emphasis on safety training,
communication between employees and management, frequent safety inspections, “good
housekeeping” of the working environment, a mature workforce with low turnover, and
promotion and recognition of safety.
Management commitment to safety was thought to be important because Zohar
found published and anecdotal evidence that companies where top management was
involved and in safety matters and gave priority to safety concerns at meetings had few
fewer accidents. Rank of the safety officer was another way companies could show they
valued safety, with low accident company safety officers having a higher status.
Emphasis on safety training was also thought to play a major role in determining safe
companies as companies who treated safety training as a main component of their new
employee trainings reported fewer accidents or was given periodically as a
supplementary training. Communication between workers and management was
considered especially important in safer organizations, along with frequent safety
inspections. Good housekeeping, consisting of maintaining order in a plant or
manufacturing environment and use of protective equipment, was also thought to set safe
companies apart from those with more accidents. A stable workforce was also thought to
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indirectly contribute to fewer accidents because companies with more tenured employees
may better employee relations. Safety promotion and recognition was the last
characteristic Zohar found in his literature review which might contribute to employee
safety.
From these characteristics, Zohar developed a scale to measure the climate of
safety in organizations. The scale consisted of seven dimensions: management
commitment to safety, perceived effects of safe conduct on promotion (with safe
behavior not hindering one’s chances of promotion due to outcomes such as longer time
to production), perceived effects of safe conduct on social status (with safe behavior not
looked down upon), perceived organizational status of the safety officer, perceived
importance and effectiveness of safety training, perceived level of risk at work, and
perceived effectiveness of enforcement vs. guidance in promoting safety. Exploratory
factor analysis revealed eight factors (in order of % variance explained): importance of
safety training programs, management attitudes toward safety, effects of safe conduct on
promotion, level of risk at work, effects of required work pace on safety, status of the
safety officer, effects of safe conduct on social status, and status on the safety committee.
Subject matter experts then rated safety in each of 12 organizations.
Correlational analyses showed significant relationships between employee safety climate
scores and expert rankings. These results led Zohar to conclude that management
commitment to safety was a major factor affecting safety, a construct that is still integral
to measures of safety climate today (Christian et al., 2009). This inaugural study showed
that there was indeed a relationship between measured safety climate and safety within

14

organizations. Additionally, the dimension effects of safe conduct on social status has
been used by others to measure co-worker support (see Mueller, DaSilva, Townsend, &
Tetrick, 1999).
Safety Climate
Safety climate is often thought of as employees’ shared perceptions of their
organization’s policies, procedures, and practices as they relate to the importance of
safety within the organization (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Zohar, 1980, 2000, 2011).
However, employees must first recognize what the true policies, procedures, and
practices of the organization are. Complicating these perceptions is the difference
between the espoused and enacted policies and procedures surrounding safety (Zohar,
2011). Espoused policies and procedures are the formal statements made about how the
company expects employees to behave with regards to safety. Enacted policies and
procedures refer to the actual implementation of safety rules, usually by managers or
supervisors (Zohar, 2011).
There are several reasons why espoused vs. enacted policies and procedures may
be different. Managers and supervisors implement policy and procedure and it is accepted
that there are more unique situations within an organization than there are company
policies and it is up to the manager to apply organizational policies (Zohar, 2003). This
application may not always be consistent, and it may be confounded by a low relative
priority of safety within the organization (Zohar, 2010). Organizations have multiple
goals related to their performance (which is where specific policies, practices, and
procedures originate) and the comparative importance of those goals within a given
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organization informs managers on their application of policy and procedure (Zohar,
2010). As an example, the relative priorities of production and safety are often cited as
two important competing demands in terms of safety outcomes. Even if the organization
espouses safety to be the most important priority, if the competing demand of production
(e.g., delivering a product faster, taking shortcuts) is routinely given higher priority by
upper management (e.g., do whatever it takes to deliver on time), supervisors will enact
safety policies consistent with the higher priority.
For example, though a company policy may be that safety is the most important
aspect of the company and all decisions should be made to conform to the highest safety
standards, if managers are rewarded for having deliveries arrive on time or early then
they will continue to push their subordinates to deliver on time or early, regardless of
safety concerns. Additionally, espoused and enacted safety policies may differ based on
characteristics of the supervisor (Huang et al., under review). Supervisors may act as
gatekeepers of company safety information (Zohar & Luria, 2010), restricting the
information they pass along to subordinates to be more in line with their own mental
models of safety. Conversely, supervisors may act more as communicators (Huang et al.,
under review), even enforcing safety standards beyond the expectations of the company.
For these reasons, only perceptions of enacted safety policy and procedure should be used
to assess safety climate.
The multi-level nature of safety climate. Previous studies have provided support
for safety climate as a multi-level construct comprising two levels: organization-level
(employees’ perceptions of the company’s commitment to and prioritization of safety)
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and group-level (employees’ perceptions of their direct supervisors’ commitment to and
prioritization of safety). According to Zohar and Luria (2005), instituted policies and
procedures (as opposed to those that have been formally declared) form the primary
referent of organization-level perceptions, while supervisory practices – supervisor
implementation of organizational policies and procedures - constitute the target of grouplevel perceptions.
While organizational climate had traditionally been considered at a single level of
analysis (see Zohar & Luria, 2005), a multi-level view of safety climate should be used in
order to reduce conceptual ambiguity. Each level refers to a different referent and
employees can differentiate between company-level priorities and the priorities of their
own unit (Zohar, 2000, 2011). It is important to note that while the organizational climate
literature often uses the term “levels” of climate to mean “level of analysis” (Schneider et
al., 2011), the safety climate literature refers to “levels” of safety climate as a short hand
way to convey the referent in a safety climate measure. That is, organization-level safety
climate measures use the organization as the referent while group-level safety climate
measures use the supervisor as the referent. In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, the
current manuscript will use the term supervisor-level safety climate from this point when
referring to safety climate scales which use the supervisor as the referent.
It is thought that organization-level safety climate predicts supervisor-level safety
climate due to the constraints organizational policy and procedures as they relate to safety
place on supervisory practice (Zohar & Luria, 2005). That is, the very mechanism which
gives rise to separate levels of organization and supervisor safety climate also provides a
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strong predictive link between the two constructs. While the mediation effects of
supervisor-level safety climate been tested and supported in previous research (see Zohar
& Luria, 2005), the current study tested a replication of the relationship.
The formation of shared climate perceptions. Safety climate can be considered
in terms of its degree of favorability within the organization (high/low or
positive/negative) and its strength or variability (how much consensus exists among
employees; strong/weak; Zohar, 2003). Four theories have been posited to identify the
way employees come to share their perceptions of safety climate: the structural approach,
the symbolic interactionist approach, the attraction-selection-attrition approach, and
leadership (Zohar, 2010).
The structural approach to the formation of climates focuses on the environment
and the work context influencing workers’ perceptions of safety (Payne & Pugh, 1976).
Aspects of the environment which may influence climate perceptions include the
structure of the organization, technology available to workers (e.g., in-vehicle
computers), and training programs. The structural approach holds that individuals form
their perceptions of the importance of safety through these objective markers of the
environment. For example, truck drivers spend a great deal of time interacting with their
“environment” (e.g., truck), which may be largely provided by the company.
Symbolic interaction and sensemaking are other ways in which climates may
form. Symbolic interactionism (Schneider & Reichers, 1983) posits that members of the
same group compare their perceptions and realities, modifying them according to others’
observations until a shared perception is formed. Social interactions between people (e.g.,
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verbal communication) are thought to be the main medium through which this
sensemaking occurs (Blumer, 1969). Sensemaking, seen as a different label of symbolic
interaction (Zohar, 2010), is the ongoing process of people interpreting ambiguous
situations or situation that are at odds with expectations and attempting to make those
situations less surprising (Brown, 2000). Zohar (2010) has also suggested that shared
employee perceptions (the basis of climate) are formed through symbolic interaction and
sense-making.
The attraction-selection-attrition approach (Schneider, 1987) holds that
organizations hire similar employees and therefore have similar perceptions regarding
safety within the organization. This perspective suggests that individuals are attracted to
jobs and organizations that are in line with their wants and expectations, organizations
select employees who “match” what the organization is looking for, and employees who
do not “match” as well as they or the company would like may either quit or be fired
(Schneider & Reichers, 1983). Workers who care about safety may be attracted to
working for particular companies because these companies have good safety reputations
or, conversely, leave if safety is neglected.
Another important aspect of the formation of climate is the impact of leadership.
It is often said that leaders create climate (Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939). This saying is
largely understood to mean that leaders can influence employee safety perceptions by
implementing organizational policies and procedures, called supervisory practices
(Zohar, 2010, 2011). Supervisory practices may inform safety climate perceptions
through employee observations of how supervisors and managers prioritize safety in their
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decisions (i.e., safety vs. production; Zohar, 2010). In fact, management commitment to
safety has been the dimension included most often in safety climate research (Zohar,
2010).
Although shared perceptions have previously been identified as critical to
understanding safety climate, not all workers have the opportunity to work in close
contact with their supervisors or co-workers. An extreme example of not having an
opportunity to interact with co-workers or supervisors is the lone or mobile worker. Lone
workers are employees who work by themselves, without close or direct supervision
(United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive, 2013). These lone workers may have
limited contact with their co-workers and possibly their supervisors, reducing the number
of opportunities to reconcile their individual perceptions.
Safety Climate Outcomes
Employee safety climate perceptions have been linked to a variety of employee
outcomes, including accidents and injuries (Johnson, 2007), safety participation and
compliance (Clarke, 2006), turnover (McCaughey, DelliFraine, McGhan, & Bruning,
2013), job satisfaction (Clarke, 2010), employee health and well-being (Oliver, Cheyne,
Tomas, & Cox, 2002), and organizational commitment (P. C. Morrow & Crum, 1998).
While studies have indicated that safety climate is related to outcomes beyond safety
behavior and accidents/injuries, the current study will focus on safety-related outcomes.
However, it is important to note the larger impact safety climate can have on an
organization. The following section provides a summary of safety-related outcomes of
safety climate.
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Safety climate outcomes. Research has shown that safety climate is a strong
predictor of safety outcomes (Christian, et al., 2009; Nahrgang, et al., 2011). Safety
climate has been shown to have both direct and indirect effects on accidents and injuries
(Clarke, 2006, 2010; Zohar, 1980, 2000). However, meta-analytic support has been found
for the indirect relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes using safety
behavior as a mediator (Christian et al., 2009).
Safety performance. Safety performance can be seen as a facet of job
performance behaviors (Neal & Griffin, 2004), especially in jobs where maintaining
certain levels of safety is germane to the task itself (e.g., mining, construction). The broad
literature makes the distinction between safety compliance and safety participation, two
aspects of safety performance. Safety compliance is essentially acting according to policy
and procedure in terms of the safety aspects of one’s job. For example, if wearing a hard
hat is considered a regulation for working on a job site and an employee wears his or her
hard hat, they are complying. Safety participation, on the other hand, deals with
discretionary behaviors performed by an individual when he or she may not be rewarded
for that behavior or the behavior may not contribute directly to the safety of that
individual (Neal, et al., 2000). For example, if an employee attends non-required
meetings about safety or joins a committee to promote safe behavior, that person is
participating. Safety participation seems to be analogous to the concept of organizational
citizenship behaviors, but with a specific intention (Clarke, 2006).
Safety climate is a known antecedent of both compliance and participation (Neal
et al., 2000). Although many individual studies showed the relationship between safety
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climate and safety performance (e.g., Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal et al., 2003; Zacharatos,
Barling, & Iverson, 2005), meta-analyses confirmed the relationship in a larger sample of
studies. Clarke (2006) found that safety climate perceptions were significantly related to
both safety compliance (ρ = .43) and safety participation (ρ = .50). In turn, safety
compliance and participation were found to be significantly related to accident and injury
outcomes (compliance, ρ = .09; participation, ρ = .14). Safety climate was also found to
be related to accident and injury outcomes (ρ = .22). While Clarke did hypothesize that
the relationships between the safety performance variables and accident and injury
outcomes would be greater than the relationship between safety climate and accident and
injury outcomes, support for the hypothesis was not found. It should be noted that Clarke
collapsed (likely due to the number of studies) organization- and supervisor-level
perceptions of safety climate into one “safety climate” variable, not allowing for tests of
the causal or mediation relationship between organization- and supervisor-level safety
climates.
Neal and Griffin (2004) offered a mechanism by which safety climate may affect
safety outcomes. Their model demonstrates how safety climate, organizational factors,
and individual level antecedents (e.g., attitudes) influence individual safety knowledge
and motivation, which in turn leads to safety performance. Neal and Griffin’s model of
safety performance borrows heavily from Campbell’s model of performance (Campbell,
McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993), where employee knowledge, skill, and motivation are
used to predict performance. Safety knowledge involves having the fundamental
knowledge of how to use safety equipment and basic skills, such as being able to problem
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solve in difficult situations. Safety motivation is a willingness to perform safe behaviors
and can be influenced by the expected outcomes of performing the behavior (Neal &
Griffin, 2006). High safety climate is thought to lead to increases in safety knowledge,
skill, and motivation, which in turn predict safety performance behaviors, safety
participation and safety compliance. In the literature, safety performance is often referred
to as safety behaviors and the two subcomponents of participation and compliance are
collapsed.
Christian and colleagues (2009) tested Griffin and Neal’s (2000) model of safety
performance with a meta-analytic path analysis. The results showed that individual-level
safety climate was positively related to safety knowledge and motivation, knowledge and
motivation were significantly related to performance, and safety performance was found
to be significantly related to accidents and injuries. Psychological safety climate, the
individual level of safety climate used in the current study, was found to be significantly
related to safety performance (ρ = .49) and accident and injury outcomes (ρ = .14).
Christian et al. (2009) did find support for stronger relationships between more proximal
variables, which was similar to the hypothesis proposed (but not supported due to low
sample sizes) by Clarke (2006).
Using safety behaviors as an outcome of safety climate may allow research to
obtain a more accurate understanding of the impact of safety climate. Objective accidents
and injuries tend to be low base rate events (Christian et al., 2009) and the resulting
relationships can be weak (Zohar, 2000), possibly due to lack of statistical power.
Additionally, safety behavior is a more proximal outcome than accidents and injuries.
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The current study used measures of both self-reported safety behaviors and objective
accident and injury outcomes.
Summary
The construct of organizational climate had previously been used in the literature
as a way to predict a great many organizational outcomes. However, with lack of
specificity in the predictor as compared to the outcome, inconsistent findings were
common in the field. Zohar (1980) was the first to follow Schneider’s (1975)
recommendation that climate be specified as relating to the policies, procedures, and
practices aligned with a given organizational goal (e.g., safety). Additionally, employees
can perceive safety climate as it related to the enacted policies of the organization and the
practices and procedures implemented by supervisors. Safety climate research has shown
that safety climate is a leading indicator of employee safety outcomes.
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CHAPTER THREE
CO-WORKERS’ ROLE IN SAFETY: APPLICATION TO LONE
AND REMOTE WORKERS
Lone and Remote Workers
The National Health Service of the United Kingdom (NHS, 2005) defines lone
working as “any situation or location in which someone works without a colleague
nearby; or when someone is working out of sight or earshot of another colleague” (p. 4).
The Health and Safety Executive of the United Kingdom (HSE) defined lone workers are
those who work away from direct supervision (HSE, 2015). Lone workers are a varied
group and include both fixed and mobile workers (HSE, 2013). Fixed lone workers may
work in kiosks or small shops, while mobile lone workers work away from a fixed base,
such as repair workers, social workers, bus drivers, etc. Truck drivers fit into the mobile
lone worker category. Note the definition of lone worker is not necessarily one person
working by themselves, by employees working away from supervision. Remote workers,
a term used in the United States, fall under the same category as lone workers in that they
work removed from an in-person supervisor and rely on electronic communication
(Barsness, Diekmann, & Seidel, 2005; Kurland & Bailey, 1999).
Lone workers may constitute a subgroup where the recent safety literature may
not be as applicable. While shared perceptions have previously been identified as critical
to understanding safety climate, not all workers have the opportunity to work in close
contact with their supervisors or even co-workers. These lone workers may have limited
contact with their co-workers and possibly their supervisors, reducing the number of
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opportunities to reconcile their individual perceptions and participate in group
sensemaking. For example, at least one study has shown that truck drivers (considered
lone workers) lack shared perceptions of safety climate among their working (supervisor
level) groups (Huang et al., 2013). There was not significant between-group variance in
safety climate perceptions, so it was not meaningful to examine shared safety climate
perceptions (see Bliese, 2000).
While most truck drivers do work alone, a portion of drivers work and drive with
a teammate, called “team drivers”. Team drivers are dyads who operate the truck in serial
so more miles can be covered (thereby earning more money under the “pay by mile”
compensation system). Trucking company websites recruiting for team drivers offer two
options in finding a teammate (for examples, see C.R. England, 2015; Schneider, 2015;
U.S. Express, 2015). Drivers can use a matching program the company offers based on
the number of miles they would prefer to drive, preferred gender of the teammate, and
whether or not they smoke and if they would prefer a smoker or non-smoker for a
teammate. Additionally, companies also offer drivers the option to choose their own
teammate. Companies mention that in choosing a teammate, it is very important to be
able to trust that person. Therefore, they also suggest teaming up with people you may
already know, like someone from your hometown, a father-son team, or a friend you have
made at a truck stop. While not explicitly mentioned in the recruiting materials but shown
as testimonials on many company sites, team drivers may also be husband and wife pairs.
While both team drivers are almost always in the cab together, it is possible they
do not have much of a chance to socialize. Federal Motor Carrier guidelines limit the
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amount of time the driver who is not currently driving can spend in the front of the cab to
two hours and count that time toward their required rest time. Therefore, it is possible
that due to the limited contact with supervisors and other co-workers besides one
teammate, team drivers may not have shared perceptions of safety climate.
One reason lone workers may lack shared perceptions of supervisor-level safety
climate is that climate perceptions are thought to be formed through the symbolic
interaction of employees within a given group, or co-workers (Schneider & Reichers,
1983). As discussed in Chapter 2, the symbolic interactionist view states that employees
discuss events and continually modify their understanding until a consensus, or socially
constructed reality, is reached (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). Without access to coworkers other than their teammate, it would be almost impossible for truck drivers to
construct this shared reality. Therefore, instead of using truck drivers’ shared perceptions
of safety climate (i.e., aggregating individual climate perceptions and conducting multilevel analyses), the current study used individual perceptions of characteristics of the
organization and supervisory practices as they relate to safety and analyze data at the
individual level. This approach represents an examination of psychological safety climate
(Beus et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009).
Psychological Safety Climate
Psychological safety climate is a term used to describe individual-level
perceptions of the importance of safety within an organization (Beus et al., 2010), or the
formally and informally enforced and rewarded policies, practices, and procedures
surrounding safety (Neal & Griffin, 2000). Much of the early research conducted on
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safety climate used individual-level perceptions of safety (Zohar & Luria, 2005).
Psychological safety climate has previously been shown in meta-analyses to be related to
individual injury outcomes (Beus et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009). Huang and
colleagues (2013) showed that just as in multi-level analyses of safety climate,
employees’ individual psychological safety climate perceptions also have a significant
effect on worker’s safety behavior and injury outcomes. Huang and colleagues created
the trucking safety climate scale and tested its reliability and validity in predicting
accident and injury outcomes. The current study utilizes the trucking safety climate scales
and adds information on the role of co-workers.
Co-Worker Support for Safety
In comparison to the safety climate literature, far less attention has been paid to
the role co-workers play in determining employee safety behavior. While a construct
referred to as “group-level” safety climate has been studied, this construct focuses on
direct supervisors and their implementation of company policy and procedure, as opposed
to the influence of members of any “group” of which the employee is a part (Zohar &
Luria, 2005). Understanding the influence co-workers may have on employees,
particularly when it comes to safe behavior at work, can be critical when the majority of
one’s work is done while on a team or in a group setting, such as team truck drivers.
Social Support
The social support literature is one area that can provide background on the
concept of co-worker support for safety. Social support is broadly seen as help or
assistance given to others or actions that are intended to be helpful (Langford, Bowsher,
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Maloney, & Lillis, 1997; Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990). It has been argued that
social support can attenuate the negative outcomes associated with demands at work
(Karasek et al., 1998). Additionally, social support has been meta-analytically shown to
buffer the negative effects of stressors on feelings of role overload, stress, and burnout
(Humphrey, Nahrgang, & Morgeson, 2007). While the construct of social support is very
broad, it can be classified into four major types: informational support, emotional
support, instrumental support, and appraisal support.
Informational support is the support provided by giving an individual information
during a time of stress (Langford et al., 1997). According to Cutrona and Russell (1990),
this type of simple act can help individuals problem solve during times of stress and help
themselves. Stewart and Barling (1996) found that increased informational support
buffered the negative effects of job stress on job performance.
The construct of emotional support is similar to what we may think of with the
lay term “giving support.” Emotional support involves giving empathy, care, and love to
another (House, 1981). House described emotional support as the most important type of
support, and this emphasis is reflected in many measures of co-worker support (e.g., “My
co-workers care about me”). Within the work context, emotional support has been shown
to decrease nurses’ reported job stress and increases in job performance (AbuAlRub,
2004).
Instrumental support is the giving of concrete and tangible assistance to another
(House, 1981; Langford, et al., 1997). For example, instrumental support may include
giving aid in the form of money or other tangibles, or performing tasks for another. While
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instrumental support, like other forms of support, has been shown to lead to positive
outcomes for individuals (e.g., Cutrona & Russell, 1990), studies have shown that
receiving unwanted instrumental help can have negative stress-inducing outcomes
(Deelstra et al., 2003).
Appraisal support, also called affirmational support (Kahn & Antonucci, 1980), is
support provided by giving information related to self-evaluation rather than information
helpful for problem solving (as in informational support; Langford et al., 1997). Kahn
and Antonucci (1980) describe affirmational support as information given about how
appropriate one’s actions or statements are (e.g., a “good job” or “atta boy”-type
statement).
However, research in practice has often used generic measures of support.
(Barrera, 1986) has argued that support needs to be operationalized more clearly and
specifically, similar to Schneider’s (1975) suggestion that organizational climate only be
used with a specific referent in mind. Barrera even went so far as to say the global
measures of social support be “abandoned” (p. 414) in favor of more specific language
due to the broad and vague nature of the construct. The current study followed Barrera’s
recommendation and specifically assessed co-worker support for safety.
With regard to the source of social support, previous research of social support at
work has focused a great deal on the role of supervisor support. Supervisor support is the
degree to which employees feel supervisors value their contribution to the organization
and care about their well-being (Eisenberger, Stinglhamber, Vandenberghe, Sucharski, &
Rhoades, 2002). This construct has been shown to be positively related to job satisfaction
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(Steinhardt, Dolbier, Gottlieb, & McCalister, 2003), on the job learning (McCall,
Lombardo, & Morrison, 1988), and organizational commitment (Scandura & Lankau,
1997). However, less attention has been given to the role of co-worker support.
Co-Worker Support
A recent meta-analysis has reviewed the literature relevant to the effects of coworkers on work-related outcomes. Chiaburu and Harrison (2008) examined co-worker
support and co-worker antagonism. Co-worker support, similar to the social support
literature, was defined as co-workers providing wanted resources to another employee
(examples include helping with tasks, mentoring, and being kind). Co-worker
antagonism, much the opposite of support, was defined as co-workers behaving in an
unwanted way toward another employee (examples include incivility and interpersonal
abuse).
Chiaburu and Harrison’s (2008) research questions included examining if coworkers have an influence beyond supervisors and leaders and if co-workers have a
positive relationship with job attitudes and a negative relationship with withdrawal
behaviors. The authors’ hypotheses regarding the relationships between co-worker
influence and positive and negative outcomes were supported; co-worker support was
found to be positively related to job satisfaction (ρ = .40), job involvement (ρ = .35),
organizational commitment (ρ = .32), and negatively related to effort reduction (ρ = -.23),
absenteeism (ρ = -.08), intent to quit (ρ = -.27), and turnover (ρ = -.17). In terms of
individual effectiveness outcomes, co-worker support was negatively related to
counterproductive work behaviors directed at the organization (ρ = -.04) and at an
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individual (ρ = -.07), and positively related to organizational citizenship behaviors
directed toward the organization (ρ = .12) and an individual (ρ = .19), and task
performance (ρ = .24). Additionally, when taking the relationships between leader
influences and employee outcomes into consideration, results revealed that co-worker
support contributed above and beyond leader support in predicting job involvement (coworker ρ = .33, leader ρ = .06), effort reduction (co-worker ρ = -.22, leader ρ = -.04), and
absenteeism (co-worker ρ = -.08, leader ρ = -.01). For the outcome of task performance,
co-worker and leader support predicted equally (ρ = -.13). In comparing results of the
current meta-analysis with previous studies, the effects sizes for co-worker influences
were found to be as large or larger than almost all of the effect sizes for leader influence.
The results of this meta-analysis are important for the current study for two
reasons. First, this meta-analysis shows that co-worker support, even though very broadly
defined in this study, does influence employee work outcomes, including task
performance. Because safety is considered as part of a truck driver’s performance, it is
possible that co-worker support for a specific outcome (i.e., safe behavior) will also
influence truck driver task performance. Second, the meta-analysis showed that coworkers do have an influence beyond the influence of leaders and supervisors. The
current study also examined if and how co-workers extend their influence beyond the
organization and supervisor. While past research has shown that company and
management support for safety are critical, little research has showed interest in how coworkers add to safety-related behaviors beyond company and management support for
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safety. Practically, if co-workers have an influence beyond leaders, then interventions to
increase safety at work may benefit from a more holistic approach.
Theories Supporting Co-worker Influence
Multiple theories and theoretical frameworks can account for the influence of coworkers and co-worker support (specifically safety support) on employee safety
outcomes. Broadly, Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory posits that people can learn
not only through the direct reinforcement of their behavior, but also through vicarious
learning and watching the outcomes of another’s behavior. In terms of vicarious learning,
safety climate theorists argue that safety climate, being shared perceptions, provides
norms and social cues for employee behavior. In a very basic sense, employees see others
around them not only modeling safe behavior, but also being rewarded for being safe or
reprimanded for acting unsafely (Casey & Krauss, 2013).
Turner and colleagues (2010) argue that social information processing theory is
another broad theory that can explain how co-workers affect behavior. Social information
processing theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) posits that in uncertain situations, people
use contextual information to inform what actions they should take. In particular, social
information processing theory focuses on the work environment as the social context.
This theory suggests that employees will take cues from their own past behavior and their
immediate social environment (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).
Latané’s (1981) social impact theory describes a more specific mechanism by
which the social context (i.e., other individuals) can influence behavior. Social impact
theory (SIT) contains three principles to describe how others impact one’s “physiological
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states and subjective feelings, motives and emotions, cognitions and beliefs, [or] values
and behavior” (Latané, 1981; p. 343). SIT posits that social influence is a function of the
strength, immediacy, number of others. The strength of others generally refers to the
power, salience, or intensity of the source of social influence. Sources with more power
over the individual or more intensity will have greater impact. Immediacy is the physical
proximity or closeness of an individual and another. Latané (1981) suggests that the more
proximal the source of the influence, the more social impact that source will have.
Finally, the number of sources is also important. The more sources exerting the influence,
the more impact the source will have. Social impact theory provides a possible
explanation for both the mediating effects of co-workers on employee safety behavior
and the incremental effects of co-worker safety support over manager safety support that
have been found in the literature.
The Job-Demands-Resource model (JD-R; Bakker & Demerouti, 2007;
Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, & Schaufeli, 2001) and general occupational social
support may also help explain how co-workers can have an influence on employee
behavior. The JD-R model proposes that job-related factors can be classified into either
job demands or job resources. Job demands are the factors require physical or
psychological effort and are related to negative well-being outcomes. Job resources are
the factors that help ahcieve goals, reduce demands, or stimulate growth (Bakker &
Demerouti, 2007). Two processes are included in the JD-R model. Fundamentally, job
demands lead to negative well-being outcomes through experienced strains, while job
resources lead to positive outcomes through increased motivation. Job demands can also
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moderate the positive outcome relationship just as job resources can moderate the
negative outcome relationship. The JD-R model can aid in explaining how co-worker
support for safety can moderate the relationship between supervisor safety climate and
employee safety behavior.
Co-workers and Safety
A small amount of research has been conducted which examines co-workers in
the context of safety at work. This research varies with respect to the importance and role
of co-workers, with some studies mentioning co-workers as a dimension in a safety
climate scale and others examining co-workers as a separate variable that may impact
safety behavior. This following section provides a review of this literature.
Co-workers as a safety dimension. Studies have used co-worker support as a
dimension within an overall safety climate scale. For example, Seo, Torabi, Blair, and
Ellis (2004) created a new safety climate measure meant to address the inadequacies of
previous measures. Seo and colleagues reviewed safety climate scales for the constructs
and subdimensions they measured and found that the most common dimensions were
leadership support (management commitment to safety), employee participation, work
pressure, competence level, hazard level, perceived risk, co-workers’ safety support, and
perceived barriers to safety. Based on their findings, Seo and colleagues created a
measure of safety climate that included six items that related to co-worker support within
the 32-item measure of safety climate. The 2004 scale was then used in a 2005 study by
Seo. Safety climate was calculated by averaging responses to all of the subdimensions,
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including co-worker support. Seo (2005) found that safety climate was a leading indicator
of safety behavior, but did not examine the unique influence of co-worker support.
Hahn and Murphy (2008) created a shortened 6-item measure of safety climate
which included one item for each of three constructs: co-worker behavioral norms
(example item “New employees learn pretty quickly that they are expected to follow
good health and safety practices”), safety feedback, and worker involvement, and three
items to measure management commitment. The safety climate scale was found to be
negatively related to injury within a hospital setting.
Kines and colleagues (2011) developed the Nordic Safety Climate Questionnaire
as a diagnostic tool in measuring safety climate based on organizational and safety
climate theory. Kines and colleagues included two subdimensions related to co-workers:
workgroup safety priority and commitment and trust in co-worker safety competence.
The scale was found to be reliable and valid and highlights the importance of considering
how co-workers affect safety outcomes.
Hayes, Perander, Smecko, and Trask (1998) assessed the constructs of job safety,
co-worker safety, supervisor safety, management safety practices, and satisfaction with
the safety program. The items relating to co-worker safety measured the degree to which
the individuals one works with ignore safety rules, encourages others to be safe, etc.
These items measured a construct quite different from either shared perceptions of policy
and procedure or supervisor implementation of policy and procedure, yet the co-worker
safety items were consistently one of the better predictors of compliance with safety
behaviors. However, the authors framed their results heavily in terms of the effects of

36

management and supervisor safety. It is possible that at the time, the authors did not have
an accepted framework available for discussing co-worker effects, but at that time the
literature did provide a robust framework for management and supervisor effects.
Studies have also assessed the effects of co-workers using separate co-worker
constructs. The constructs themselves are varied, but they are used in the context of
safety outcomes. For example, in a Chinese sample, Jiang, Yu, Li, and Li (2010) found
that employee perceptions of co-worker safety knowledge and behavior predicted
employee safety behaviors and that this relationship was moderated by unit-level safety
climate perceptions. For employees in units high in safety climate, the relationship
between co-worker safety knowledge and behavior and safety behavior was stronger.
This study provides additional evidence that the role of co-workers must be taken into
account when examining how safety climate affects accident and injury outcomes.
Kath and colleagues (Kath, Marks, & Ranney, 2010) examined the effects of coworkers as a dimension of safety climate. The authors used the construct “safety peer
pressure” from a modified version of Zohar’s 1980 measure, acknowledging that the
pressure could have positive or negative outcomes depending on whether the pressure
was to behave safely or unsafely. A sample item is “My co-workers expect other workers
to behave safely”. Hierarchical analyses controlling for leader-member exchange,
perceived organizational support, management attitudes toward safety, and safety job
demands revealed that co-worker safety/safety peer pressure was not significant beyond
the other variables in predicting upward safety communication (i.e., the willingness of
employees to bring safety-related concerns to their superior’s attention). These results
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indicate that co-workers may not influence how comfortable employees are in expressing
their concerns when other organizational variables are considered. However, Kath and
colleagues did not expect co-workers to influence communication with supervisors. They
believed relationships between the employee and their supervisor should be more
predictive because the supervisor has more control over the employee’s work.
Co-worker support and safety outcomes. Research assessing the social support
of co-workers, measured with items such as “You can count on colleague backup at
work”, found that increases in co-worker social support predicted increased safety
compliance behaviors (Turner, Stride, Carter, McCaughey, & Carroll, 2012).
Additionally, co-worker social support was found to moderate the relationship between
job control and safety participation, such that when emergency room personnel
experienced higher levels of social support, the positive relationship between job control
and safety participation was enhanced. However, the study did not find a significant
direct relationship between co-worker social support and safety participation.
Gillen, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, and Vaccaro (2002) studied safety climate within
the construction industry. The authors used the Job Content Questionnaire (JCQ),
including the general co-worker support dimension, to measure employee strain and how
it might affect safety climate perceptions. Correlational analyses showed that co-worker
support was not related to injury severity, but increased co-worker support was
significantly correlated with increased perceptions of workplace safety.
Co-worker support for safety. Some studies have followed Barrera’s (1986)
advice and used a co-worker support construct that is specific in its target. Examining the
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trust, shared norms, and obligation facets of social capital theory on safety outcomes,
Watson, Scott, Bishop, and Turnbeaugh (2005) proposed a model comparing the
influences of trust in supervisor, co-worker safety norms, and management safety values
on perceived safety of the work environment and at-risk behavior. Co-worker safety
norms were defined as the unwritten rules that govern expectations for behavior and
establish boundaries for accepted safe conduct. Analysis revealed that while co-worker
norms, along with trust in the supervisor and management safety values, were predictive
of increased perceptions of a safe work environment and decreased at-risk behavior, coworker norms were more predictive of decreases in at-risk behavior than were
management safety values.
However, three of the four items to measure co-worker norms focused on
behaviors (e.g., “If members of my work crew noticed a safety hazard, they will take
corrective action”) while only one item focused on what could traditionally be considered
a “norm” (e.g., “Members of my work crew almost always wear their safety equipment”).
These action-based items are more similar to what previous studies (and the current
study) refer to as co-worker support for safety.
Co-worker support for safety has been examined by Casey and Krauss (2013),
who studied South African miners’ safety and how error management climate may
ultimately contribute to safety outcomes. The authors hypothesized a path model
detailing relationships between error management climate (shared perceptions of
organizational practices related to dealing with errors when they do occur,
communicating about errors, and “sharing error knowledge”; p. 133), supervisor and co-
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worker safety support, upward and within-team safety communication, safety behavior,
and safety incidents. The authors measured co-worker safety support with three subdimensions: social pressure to work safely, team support, and safety cohesion. Path
analysis revealed that the path from error management climate è co-worker safety
support è within-team safety communication, leading to safety behaviors and safety
outcomes was significant. Supervisor safety support did not show a significant path to
safety behavior, but was found to exert an effect on upward safety communication. A
direct path from co-worker safety support to safety behavior was also not supported. This
study suggests a possible mechanism for co-worker support for safety to influence safety
outcomes may be through within-team safety communication.
Morrow, McGonagle, Dove-Steinkamp, Walker, Marmet, and Barnes-Farrell
(2010) studied a construct they called “co-worker safety” and its relationship, along with
management safety and work-safety tension, to unsafe behaviors. Co-worker safety was
measured using a modified version of Zohar’s (1980) safety climate subdimension “effect
of safe behavior on social status”. The study authors predicted that all three facets of
safety climate would be predictive of unsafe behaviors, but that co-worker safety would
have the weakest effect because they believed co-workers do not have a direct influence
on an employee’s job or pay. Hierarchical regression revealed that co-worker safety
2

contributed the smallest change in R , supporting their hypothesis. However, dominance
analysis revealed that management safety (i.e., management commitment to safety) did
not reliably dominate the effect of co-worker safety. These ambiguous results show that
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more research is needed to understand the effects of management and co-workers on
safety outcomes.
Specific co-worker support for safety has also been found to fully mediate the
relationship between perceived organizational support for safety and safety voice, or
employees voicing safety concerns (Tucker, et al., 2008). In a sample of bus drivers (who
work alone for most of the day), perceived co-worker support for safety was found to
predict employee safety voice even when organization support for safety was entered into
the model. The authors note that while bus drivers spend much of their work day alone in
their bus, they also have opportunities for “meaningful contact” (p. 323) with co-workers
in the garage before or after a shift and during safety meetings. However, contact with
supervisors can be limited. It is possible the effect of co-workers is in fact stronger than
the effect of the organization (and organization agents), with whom the bus drivers may
have little contact.
Turner and colleagues (2010) surveyed rail workers who often worked in small
groups and were infrequently visited by a direct supervisor. Contact with top
management was even more infrequent. These conditions are similar to the current study
in that team truck drivers work closely with another person but have limited direct
contact with supervisors and top management. The researchers studied how different
sources of support would affect reported safety behavior in the previous 12-month period.
Support from top management (often referred to as company level), direct supervisors,
and co-workers was measured using sub-scales of Mueller et al.’s (1999) measure of
safety climate. A sample item for perceived co-worker support for safety was “People in
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my immediate work group who work safely try to emphasize it and make sure others do
the same”. These support items can be classified as specific co-worker support for safety
as opposed to general support from co-workers. Main effect analyses revealed that all
sources of support, including co-worker support for safety, were predictive of lower
hazardous work events. Interaction analyses revealed that all sources of support
moderated the relationship between role overload and hazardous work events and that the
magnitude of the interaction between role overload and co-worker support for safety was
larger than the interactions between top management support or supervisor support and
role overload and predicted additional variance. Due to the similarity of samples, it is
possible the current study will find similar results.
However, not all studies have found support for the role of co-worker support for
safety. Liu, Huang, Huang, Wang, Xiao, and Chen (2015) examined the relationships
between safety climate and injuries using a Chinese manufacturing sample. Co-worker
support was measured using items such as “Co-workers mention safety compliance” and
“Co-workers focus on their own work safety”. Although the authors labeled the
dimension “co-worker support”, which is often used in the literature to denote general
support, the items used match more closely with the specific support construct “coworker support for safety”. The authors created a measure of safety climate specifically
for the study and in conducting an exploratory factor analysis of the items, the factor coworker support was found to account for more variance (18.41%) than management
commitment to safety (18.12%), safety supervision (15.63%), or safety training
(10.52%). A path analysis showed that co-worker support for safety was indirectly related
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to decreased injury outcomes through increased safety compliance and personal
protective equipment use. However, co-worker support for safety was not found to be
related to a dimension of safety behavior the study authors labeled “safety initiative” or
proactive safety behavior. The authors suggested that the non-significant relationship
may be the result of cultural differences in the Chinese sample they used and the more
Western samples used by researchers who have found co-worker support for safety to
predict safety behaviors.
Co-worker safety climate. Co-worker safety climate is another less used term
that may also describe a support relationship from co-workers. Colley, Lincolne, and
Neal (2013) examined different employee profiles of perceived organizational values
(i.e., the perceptions employees have of a given organization’s values) and safety climate
perceptions at the organization, supervisor, and co-worker level. Co-worker safety
climate was measured using an adaptation of Zohar’s (2000) 10-item measure of
supervisory safety climate. A sample item is “As long as work remains on schedule, my
co-workers don’t care how this has been achieved”. Organizations were rated using the
Competing Values Framework developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983), which
divides organizational values into four competing categories: human relations (employee
morale), open systems (innovation), internal processes (stability), and rational goals
(productivity). Organizational profiles were created using a version of cluster analysis
based on these categories. Of the four profiles, it was found that employees who perceive
their organization as focusing concurrently on human relations and rational goals
reported significantly higher levels of organizational, supervisory, and co-worker safety
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climate and lower levels of first aid incidents and equipment damages (accidents). It is
possible that organizations that must balance safety and productivity have higher safety
climate in general. However, the study did not test if perceptions of safety climate at each
level were different from each other.
In a study design similar to the current study, Brondino, Silva, and Pasini (2012)
questioned the role of co-workers as “safety climate agents” (p. 1847) in transmitting
safety climate from both the organization level and the group level to individual safety
outcomes. The study authors took a multilevel approach for all levels of safety climate:
organization-level safety climate, supervisor-level safety climate, and co-worker-level
safety climate. Brondino and colleagues use the term co-worker safety climate to refer to
perceptions of safety climate shared between 91 groups of blue-collar co-workers. The
scale used was a modified version of Zohar and Luria’s (2005) group-level safety climate
scale meant for supervisors and included the subdimensions of safety communication,
safety systems, co-workers values, and safety mentoring (changed from safety training to
reflect co-workers being at the same level within the organizational hierarchy). Sample
items from each dimension include: “If it is necessary, my team members use
explanations to get other team members to act safely” (safety mentoring), “My team
members are careful about working safely also when we are tired or stressed” (safety
values), “My team members are careful that the other members receive all the equipment
needed to do the job safely” (safety systems), and “My team members talk about safety
issues throughout the work week” (safety communication).
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Brondino and colleagues (2012) conducted both individual-level and multi-level
analyses. The hypothesized path model included a partial mediation model with
organization-level safety climate (OSC) predicting supervisor-level safety climate (SSC),
co-worker safety climate (CSC) and safety behavior; SSC predicting both CSC and safety
behavior; and CSC predicting safety behavior. The results were equivocal at the group
versus the individual level. OSC was predictive of safety behavior at the individual but
not the group level, but did predict SSC and CSC at both levels. SSC was not predictive
of safety behavior at either level, but the relationship between SSC and safety behavior
was fully mediated by CSC at the individual level. Additional analyses conducted with
only CSC as a mediator between OSC and safety behavior revealed CSC to partially
mediate the relationship at the individual level, but fully mediate the relationship at the
group level.
Brondino and colleagues (2012) suggest that the effects of supervisor and coworker safety climate perceptions may completely overlap or “cancel” the effects at the
group level but that co-workers may partially transmit safety climate from the
organization level to actual safety behavior at the individual level. However, it is also
possible that in modifying the supervisor-level scale to accommodate co-workers, the
researchers were somehow still measuring constructs related to supervisors. Also, though
a construct specific to co-worker support for safety was not studied, safety climate
research indicates that management/supervisor support for safety is the most important
facet of safety climate (Beus et al., 2010). Relatedly, it is possible that an important
aspect of co-worker safety climate is co-worker support for safety.
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One important point of distinction that needs to be made in the literature is the
difference between co-worker safety climate and co-worker support for safety. While
there are currently very few references to “co-worker safety climate” in the literature, it is
important that the two concepts not be inter-changed. Just as management support for
safety is thought to be the most important dimension of safety climate, it is possible coworker support for safety is a leading dimension of co-worker safety climate.
Summary
Team truck drivers are a unique population in that they work away from a home
base and work without direct supervision. Additionally, while the two drivers are in the
same truck together, they do not spend the entire time interacting. However, interactions
between the two may provide important support for increased and sustained safety
behavior. Co-worker support for safety is a specific type of co-worker social support. Coworker support is related to improved employee job performance and several theories
account for the impact of co-workers on performance behaviors. The construct of coworker support for safety has been studied and generally found to be related to employee
safety outcomes. However, co-worker support for safety has not been previously studied
in the context of safety climate.
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CHAPTER FOUR
HYPOTHESIS FORMATION AND RATIONALE
Co-workers are the largest group most employees interact with on a daily basis
(Chiaburu & Harrison, 2013). A deeper understanding of the circumstances under which
safety behavior is influenced is extremely important when it comes to psychosocial
constructs that are regularly applied in industry settings. Not only do companies spend
large amounts of money on programs that aim to increase safety, but the outcomes of
such efforts can be measured in lives and disability, as well as in dollar amounts. A better
comprehension of how co-workers influence safety may provide guidance in safety
intervention research and practice.
The current study aimed to provide insight into how the people around employees
affect safety behavior at work. Specifically, the role of co-worker support for safety was
investigated as to its role as a mediator and/or moderator of the relationship between
safety climate and safety behavior, and as a direct causal influence of safety behavior.
See Figure 1 for the base model of the relationship between safety climate and accidents
and injuries.
Concerning the mediating effects of co-worker support for safety, it is possible
that co-workers transmit the safety climate message from higher levels in the company to
fellow co-workers in order to have an effect on employee safety behavior. Previous
research supports the transmission of the safety message from the company level to the
supervisor level in affecting employee safety behavior (Zohar & Luria, 2005).
Additionally, previous research has found that co-worker safety climate, a construct
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closely related to co-worker support for safety, fully mediated the relationship between
supervisor safety climate and safety behavior in a sample of blue collar workers
(Brondino et al., 2012). A social learning theory perspective (Bandura, 1977), along with
safety climate theory (Zohar, 1980) and social information processing theory, supports
the idea that employees learn safe behavior from watching co-workers be rewarded for
their own safe behavior under conditions of positive safety climate and then go on to
model co-workers in their own behavior.
Additionally, co-worker support for safety may also exert its influence by
supplying employees with necessary resources to overcome the stressors that may have a
negative impact on employee safety behavior. The job-demands resource (JD-R) model
(Bakker & Demerouti, 2007) and more broadly, a framework of occupational social
support, suggest that job resources such as support can reduce the negative effects of a
job demand. Previous research also supports the idea that a negative safety climate can
act as a stressor (Golubovich, Chang, & Eatough, 2014). Co-worker support for safety
has been shown to attenuate the negative impact of job demands on safety outcomes
(Turner et al., 2010) while general co-worker support has shown similar results (Turner et
al., 2012).
Hypothesis 1a: Co-worker support for safety will moderate the relationship
between supervisor-level safety climate perceptions and self-reported safety
behavior (See Figure 3).
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Hypothesis 1b: Co-worker support for safety will partially mediate the
relationship between supervisor-level safety climate perceptions and self-reported
safety behavior (See Figure 4).
Hypothesis 2a: Co-worker support for safety will moderate the relationship
between organization-level safety climate perceptions and self-reported safety
behavior (See Figure 5).
Hypothesis 2b: Co-worker support for safety will partially mediate the
relationship between organization-level safety climate perceptions and selfreported safety behavior (See Figure 6).
Hypothesis 3a: Co-worker support for safety will moderate the relationship
between organization-level safety climate and crash outcomes (See Figure 7).
Hypothesis 3b: Co-worker support for safety will partially mediate the
relationship between organization-level safety climate and crash outcomes (See
Figure 8).
Hypothesis 4a: Co-worker support for safety will moderate the relationship
between supervisor-level safety climate and crash outcomes (See Figure 9).
Hypothesis 4b: Co-worker support for safety will mediate the relationship
between supervisor-level safety climate and crash outcomes (See Figure 10).
For the moderation hypotheses, it is expected that high co-worker support for
safety will be able to diminish the negative effects of low safety climate perceptions and
enhance the positive effects of high safety climate perceptions, both at the organization
and supervisor level.
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A replication hypothesis is also included in the current study. The role of
supervisor-level safety climate as a mediator and transmitter of safety climate from
higher levels within the organization (e.g., top management) to lower levels (e.g.,
employees) has been studied by Zohar and colleagues (Zohar & Luria, 2005), but is not a
path commonly tested within the safety climate literature. The model of the supervisor as
a communicator of information from higher levels within the organization, without
altering or filtering the content of the message, supports the notion that supervisor-level
safety climate can transmit the safety message (Huang et al., under review; Zohar, 2010).
Therefore, the current study seeks to study the mediating effect of supervisor-level safety
climate on safety behavior.
Hypothesis 5: Supervisor-level safety climate will partially mediate the
relationship between organization-level safety climate and (a) co-worker support
for safety and (b) safety behavior.
The current study also seeks to understand the relative importance of the source of
the safety message on employee safety behavior. Social impact theory (Latané, 1981)
suggests that a source of social influence will have the greatest impact when it is stronger
or more powerful than other sources, physically closer, and greater in number than other
sources. The sources of influence within a given organization can be seen as top
management, supervisors, and co-workers. According to social impact theory, top
management may have the least amount of influence on employee safety behavior
because top managers are often far removed from employee involvement (physically
distant), may have less authority over employee outcomes than direct supervisors, and are
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relatively few in number. Direct supervisors may have the most power as a source of
influence because they are directly responsible for things like employee performance
appraisals.
However, co-workers are greater in number than direct supervisors and are
physically closer than supervisors, especially in the case of team truck drivers where the
teammate is present in the cabin. These circumstances would point to co-workers having
an additional impact on employee safety behavior over either company-level or
supervisor-level safety climate perceptions. Some previous research has found support
for the incremental effects of co-worker support for safety (Turner et al., 2010) while
other have not (Morrow et al., 2010; Watson et al., 2005). The current study tested the
importance of co-workers as a source of influence on employee safety behavior.
Hypothesis 6: Co-worker support for safety will have an incremental effect on
self-reported safety behaviors beyond the effects of both organization- and
supervisor-level perceptions of safety climate (Figure 7).
The current study also compared the safety behavior and safety outcomes for team
drivers reporting high co-worker support for safety, low co-worker support for safety, and
solo drivers. Previous research has shown that solo drivers experience more incidents
than team drivers (Hanowski et al., 2005), but safety behavior has not been examined, nor
has the comparison between the three groups been made.
Hypothesis 7a: Team drivers experiencing high levels of co-worker support for
safety will report increased safety behavior over team drivers experiencing low
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levels of co-worker support for safety, and solo drivers (experiencing no coworker support) will report the lowest levels of safety behavior.
Hypothesis 7b: Team drivers experiencing high levels of co-worker support for
safety will report significantly lower rates of accidents and injuries than team
drivers experiencing low levels of co-worker support for safety, and solo drivers
(experiencing no co-worker support) will report the highest levels of accidents
and injuries.
In summary, the present study extends the current literature by a) examining the
conditions under which the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes may
be weaker or stronger, b) studying the role of co-workers in a remote working situation,
and c) examining competing models of co-worker support for safety within a broader,
comprehensive model of safety climate. I investigated these hypotheses using archival
data obtained from truck drivers employed by a single, national trucking company.

52

CHAPTER FIVE
METHOD
Participants
Participants in the current study were truck drivers working for a single trucking
company within the United States. The data were gathered as part of a larger project
aimed at validating safety climate measures for the trucking industry (Huang et al., 2013).
The larger project included two waves of data collection approximately three years apart.
Prior studies that have used the collected data used wave 1 data only. The current study
uses data from wave 2 only.
The total number of truck drivers eligible to complete the survey was 8,308. Sixty
two percent completed the survey for a total sample of 5,162. Surveys where less than
50% of the data was complete were removed (77 surveys). A small percentage (9.5%) of
the truck drivers completed both wave 1 and wave 2 data collections. In order to keep the
two waves separate, the 485 participants who completed both waves were removed from
the sample, resulting in a sample of 4,600 truck drivers.
For analyses comparing team drivers and solo drivers, the total sample size was
4,600 truck drivers. For analyses focusing on co-worker support, the study participant
pool was further narrowed to those drivers the trucking company categorized as team
drivers, meaning that truck loads were driven by two truck drivers trading off driving
time so the vehicle could be almost continuously moving. The final sample of team
drivers includes 366 team drivers.
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The average age for team truck drivers was 48.3 years old (SD = 10.78) while the
average age for solo truck drivers was 47.62 years old (SD = 10.66). In response to a
question about how long they have been a truck driver (i.e., occupational tenure), solo
truck drivers reported on average 11.84 (SD = 9.39) years in the occupation while team
truck drivers reported 10.48 (SD = 8.55) years in the occupation.
All participants were non-unionized long-haul truck drivers. Driver gender was
not gathered as part of this study, partly because the company wanted to protect the
identities of any female respondents. On average, fewer than 10% of long haul truck
drivers are women.
Data Collection Procedure
The survey was completed at the end of a required web-based safety training that
the drivers complete every year. After the truck drivers completed the approximately 20minute safety training, they were invited to complete the survey and were shown an
informed consent document. If the driver agreed to participate, they were taken to the
website where the survey was hosted.
The survey took about 15 minutes to complete. Participants were asked for their
unique company ID to be used as an identifier to match their survey responses to
company injury records, which were collected and matched six months after the survey.
Five $100 gift cards were provided via lottery as incentives to encourage participation
and participants were asked to provide contact information (e.g., email or phone number)
at the end of the survey if they would like to be entered into the lottery.
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The company was provided with an executive summary of survey results, which
were aggregated to the company level. The company had no access to the raw data or to
which drivers agreed to participate in the survey.
Measures
Safety climate. Trucking industry-specific safety climate scales developed by
Huang et al. (2013) were used to assess safety climate perceptions. The scale
development process included a review of the scientific literature, a review of trucking
companies’ safety metric (e.g., crash rate, injury rate, risk scores), and semi-structured
interviews with subject matter experts (i.e., truckers, supervisors, trucking industry
insurance experts). An initial measure was formed which consisted of 100 items.
Cognitive interviews were then conducted with truck drivers and supervisors in order to
improve content and face validity. Based on results of the interviews, items were
restricted or dropped, leaving 61 items using a standard 5-point Likert scale.
The 61-item measure was then pre-tested by an additional 64 truck drivers
recruited from truck stops to ensure the changes made in the cognitive interview phase
were clear and the survey could be completed in a reasonable amount of time. The
revised 61-item measure was then used in data collection for eight trucking companies,
totaling 8,095 participants. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted with survey
data from one (pilot) trucking company totaling 2,030 participants. Based on results from
the EFA, the measure was trimmed to include 20 items measuring organization-level
safety climate and 20 items measuring supervisor-level safety climate.
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A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was then conducted using the factor
structure suggested by the results of the EFA. CFA was first conducted on data from the
pilot company and then the factor structure was validated using data from all eight
trucking companies. For a more comprehensive review of survey development and item
validation, see Huang et al. (2013).
The final scale consists of two 20-item subscales (total 40 items) measuring
organization and supervisor safety climate. Both the organization-level and supervisorlevel scales contain three sub-dimensions: proactive practices, driver safety priority, and
supervisory care promotion (organization level) and safety promotion, delivery limits,
and cell phone disapproval (supervisor level). Example items include: “My company uses
any available information to improve existing safety rules (organization-level safety
climate subscale)” and “My supervisor compliments employees who pay special attention
to safety (supervisor-level safety climate subscale)”. Prior research has demonstrated
strong psychometric properties of the overall scale and offered both construct validity and
criterion-related validity evidence to support its use in trucking samples (Huang, Zohar,
Robertson, Garabet, Lee, et al., 2013). Both the organization- and supervisor-level safety
climates scales were found to be predictive of self-reported safe driving behaviors,
injuries, and near-misses (Huang et al., 2013). See Appendix A for organization- and
supervisor-level safety climate items.
Drivers communicated with their direct supervisors (i.e., dispatchers) through cell
phones and in-vehicle communication systems. Even though multiple drivers shared the
same supervisor, most drivers have little to no opportunity to interact with their fellow
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co-workers and may not know the other drivers under their supervisor. This suggests that
shared perceptions are unlikely among drivers. A prior study of the wave 1 data revealed
ICC(1) values less than .10 and ICC(2) values less than .70 for organizational- and
supervisor-level safety climate, both of which support not aggregating the data (Bliese,
2000; LeBreton & Senter, 2008). Additionally, in the current wave 2 study, supervisors
had fewer than three direct reports in the vast majority of cases (97%). Finally,
information linking team driver dyads was not available in the current study. For these
reasons, data were examined at the individual level of analysis.
Perceived co-worker support for safety. Perceived co-worker support for safety
was measured using a modified version of Tucker et al.’s (2008) scale of perceived coworker support for safety. The original scale was developed for use with a bus driver
sample and included the referents “co-worker” and “colleagues”. An example item of the
original scale is “My co-workers are ready to talk to fellow employees who fail to use
safety equipment”. Internal consistency reliability of α = .90 was found for the original
scale. In terms of criterion related validity, Tucker et al. found the original scale mediated
the relationship between perceived organizational support for safety and employee safety
voice. The referent of the original scale was modified for the current study to refer to
“My teammate”; teammate being the term used for team drivers. Along with using a 5point Likert scale with a not applicable option, participants were given specific
instructions for answering this measure: “If you are currently a team driver, please
answer the following questions about your [Company] teammate. If you are NOT a team
driver, please choose ‘not applicable’.” Additionally, data screening procedures were
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used to limit responses to only those the company identified as a team driver. See
Appendix B.
Safety behavior. Self-reported driver safety behavior was measured using a sixitem scale adapted from Huang, Roetting, McDevvitt, Melton, and Smith (2005) using a
5-point Likert scale. Example items are “I always comply with posted speed limits” and
“I occasionally drive without getting enough sleep”. Previous studies using the modified
version of this scale have found internal consistency reliability measures to range from α
= .66 (Huang et al., 2013) to α = .75 (Zohar, Huang, Lee, & Robertson, 2014). See
Appendix C.
Objective safety outcomes. Objective safety outcomes were gathered six months after
survey data collection was complete. The objective data includes information for each
survey respondent on events that happened in the six months after data collection was
completed. Crashes and lost time injury are two such objective outcomes that were
collected. Crashes are operationalized as accidents reported by each truck driver to the
trucking company and are considered preventable incidents. The variable is not solely a
measure of severe accidents, but rather a more holistic measure of all accidents
experienced by a driver. A second objective outcome was also collected: lost time injury.
Lost time injury measures the days away from work as the result of an occupational
accident or injury. Lost time injury may also serve as a proxy for accident/injury severity,
as more severe accidents and injuries usually involve more days away from work.
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Analysis Strategy
Prior to hypothesis testing, the data were cleaned and screened for missing data.
All predictor variables were mean centered to aid in interpretation of the results.
Reliability and dimensionality of each scale was assessed. Data were analyzed using both
general linear and logistic regression. All hypotheses using the prospective, objective
outcome of crashes were tested using logistic regression. While crashes were reported on
a count basis, because they are a low base rate phenomenon, crashes were categorized as
yes/no events; the majority of truck drivers who did report a crash reported only one.
Logistic regression is the most appropriate technique when testing dichotomous outcomes
because logistic relationships between IVs and DVs are more often non-linear (Peng &
So, 2002). Logistic regressions were tested using the Generalized Linear Model menu in
SPSS.
Conditional hypotheses were tested using either general linear or logistic
regression, with dichotomous outcomes using logistic and continuous outcomes using
linear regression. Mediation hypotheses were tested using the PROCESS macro created
by Hayes (2013) for SPSS. The PROCESS macro allows for testing complex moderation
and mediation hypotheses, in addition to being able to recognize dichotomous variables
and conduct logistic regressions when necessary. PROCESS estimates the indirect effect
of mediation analyses through resampling estimates of the indirect effect and providing a
confidence interval in order to give a significance value. Bootstrapping is not constrained
by assumptions about the sample distribution and is therefore seen as a superior method
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for testing mediation (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Effect sizes for indirect effects were
calculated as a percent of total effect that is due to the indirect effect.
Hypothesis 6, involving the incremental effects of co-worker support for safety
over both organization- and supervisor-level safety climate, was tested using hierarchical
linear regression, with variables added in steps to confirm that co-worker support for
safety (to be added in step 3) explains additional variance beyond organization-level (step
1) and supervisor-level (step 2) safety climate perceptions.
Hypothesis 7a and b, involving differences in reported safety behavior and
crashes and lost time injury between team drivers experiencing high and low support and
solo drivers, were tested with linear regression for the safety behavior and lost time injury
outcomes, and logistic regression for the crash outcome. Team driver vs. solo driver
status was a dummy coded variable (i.e., drivers were categorized as 0 or 1). Predicted
values of safety behavior, crashes, and lost time injury from the team truck drivers were
compared to mean values for the solo truck drivers.
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CHAPTER SIX
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Means, standard deviations, correlations, and reliability coefficients are presented
in Tables 1 and 2. Descriptive statistics for team drivers are presented in Table 1.
Descriptive statistics for solo drivers are presented in Table 2. Correlations between study
variables were examined for both team and solo drivers to serve as a point of comparison.
Overall, the means and relationships between the two groups were found to be very
similar. Both groups had high means (over 4.0 on a 5-point scale) for organization-level
safety climate, supervisor-level safety climate, and safety behavior. Twenty-five percent
of the solo truck drivers reported a crash and of those who reported experiencing a crash,
80% reported only one crash. However, the range was up to four crashes within the
period for solo truck drivers. Of the team truck drivers, 22% reported experiencing a
crash, with the majority (87%) of those reporting a crash reporting only one. The range of
crashes for team truck drivers was 0-3. Based on the small percentage of the team truck
drivers experiencing more than one crash (3%), the crash variable was transformed into a
dichotomous yes/no variable.
Miles driven per year was included as a control variable in tests of hypotheses
where miles driven would logically be related to the outcome (i.e., crashes). The outcome
variable of lost time injury was removed from consideration due to its extremely low rate
of occurrence. Only three participants reported having days away from work due to an
injury, which does not provide sufficient variance for prediction. Two cases were
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removed from the data as they were found to be outliers, with standardized residual
values greater than 3.0 on the relationship between co-worker support for safety and
crashes.
For team drivers, the focus of the current study, organization-level and
supervisor-level safety climate were significantly and positive related (r = .79, p <.01).
Both types of safety climate were also positively related to co-worker support for safety
(organization-level: r = .30, p <.01; supervisor-level: r = .35, p < .01). The variable of
safety behavior was also positively related to organization- (r = .54, p <.01) and
supervisor-level safety climate (r = .51, p < .01), along with co-worker support for safety
(r = .44, p < .01). The dichotomous variable of crashes, coded as 0 and 1 with 1
indicating an affirmative response, was found to be related to co-worker support for
safety (r = .13, p < .05) safety behavior (r = .11, p <.05), however, the relationships were
not in the expected direction. All predictor variables were mean centered in order to aid
in interpretation.
Hypothesis Testing
Moderation analyses. The first series of hypotheses (1a-b through 4a-b) posited
that co-worker support for safety would act as a moderator and mediator of the
relationship between safety climate variables (both organization- and supervisor level
safety climate) and safety outcomes (both safety behavior and crashes). The moderation
effect of co-worker support for safety was examined first in order to determine the most
appropriate analysis steps.
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Hypothesis 1a was tested using linear regression. Supervisor-level safety climate,
co-worker support for safety, and the interaction between the two variables were added to
the model predicting safety behavior. Results indicated that while the main effects of both
supervisor-level safety climate (B = .31, SE = .04, p < .001) and co-worker support for
safety (B = .23, SE = .04, p <.001) were significant, the interaction term was not
significant (B = .001, SE = .04, p = .984). These results indicate that co-worker support
for safety did not moderate the relationship between supervisor-level safety climate and
safety behavior. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a was not supported. The model summary and
parameter estimates are shown in Table 3.
Hypothesis 2a was tested next, also using linear regression. Organization-level
safety climate, co-worker support for safety, and the interaction between the variables
were added to the model predicting safety behavior. Results indicated that the main
effects of both organization-level safety climate (B = .34, SE = .04, p <.001) and coworker support for safety (B = .22, SE = .04, p < .001) significantly predicted safety
behavior. However, the interaction term was not significant (B = -0.05, SE = .04, p =
.244), indicating that the relationship between organization-level safety climate and
safety behavior was not dependent on co-worker support for safety. The model summary
and parameter estimates are shown in Table 4.
Hypothesis 3a, the ability of co-worker support to moderate the relationship
between organization-level safety climate and crashes was also tested. Logistic regression
was used to test this relationship due to the binary nature of the crash outcome. For this
analysis, miles driven per year was used as a control variable. In order to test the
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moderating effect of co-worker support on the relationship between organization-level
safety climate and crashes, miles driven per year, organization-level safety climate, coworker support for safety, and the interaction between the two variables were included in
the model. Miles driven per year was not a significant predictor of crashes (B = .000005,
SE = .000007, OR = 1.0, p = .445). Organization-level safety climate was also not
predictive of crashes (B = .30, SE = .21, OR = 1.36, p = .142). Co-worker support for
safety was found to significantly predict crashes (B = .50, SE = .28, OR = 1.65, p = .040),
albeit in the opposite direction that was hypothesized. Finally, no significant interaction
between organization-level safety climate and co-worker support was found (B = -.55, SE
= .40, OR = .58, p = .155). Parameter estimates are shown in Table 5.
Hypothesis 4a, that the interaction between supervisor-level safety climate and
co-worker support for safety would predict crashes, was also examined using logistic
regression. Miles driven per year was included as a control variable, but was not found to
predict crashes (B = 0.000005, SE = 0.000007, OR = 1.0, p = .507). Supervisor-level
safety climate was also not found to be predictive of crashes (B = .07, SE = .21, OR =
1.08, p = .717). Co-worker support for safety was again found to significantly, positively
predict crashes (B = .51, SE = .28, OR = 1.66, p = .042), but the interaction between
supervisor-level safety climate and co-worker support for safety was not significant (B =
-0.66, SE = .40, OR = .52, p = .081). Parameter estimates are found in Table 6. The
results of these logistics regressions show that while co-worker support for safety is a
significant predictor of crashes in the opposite manner expected, it does not interact with
safety climate variables.
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Mediation analyses. Though no moderation hypotheses were supported, the
dichotomous outcome of crashes was found to be related to the study variables.
Therefore, the mediation model testing Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b and 5a-b, and the
overall four-path mediation model, was tested using the PROCESS macro and 5,000
bootstrapped samples. Miles driven per year was included as a control variable in all
models; all paths to and from the variable were found to be non-significant. Therefore,
the control variable was removed from each of the final models for parsimony. All
indirect effects can be seen in Table 7.
Hypothesis 1b, positing the partial mediating effect of co-worker support for
safety on the relationship between supervisor-level safety climate and safety behaviors,
was tested using the PROCESS macro. Supervisor-level safety climate significantly
predicted co-worker support for safety (B = .34, SE = .05, p < .001) and co-worker
support for safety significantly predicted safety behavior (B = .23, SE = .04, p < .001).
Supervisor-safety climate also significantly predicted safety behavior (B = .31, SE = .04,
p < .001), showing partial mediation. The indirect effect was significant (B = .08, SE =
.02, CI = .0399 - .1336), showing the mediation was significant and accounts for 20.37%
of the total effect. The indirect effect shows that for a one unit increase in supervisorlevel safety climate, safety behavior is expected to increase by .08 units through coworker support for safety. Therefore Hypothesis 1b was supported. Figure 12 shows the
unstandardized coefficients for the significant paths.
Hypothesis 2b, the partial mediating effect of co-worker support for safety on the
relationship between organization-level safety climate and safety behavior, was also
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supported. Organization-level safety climate was found to be significantly related to coworker support for safety (B = .30, SE = .05, p < .001) and co-worker support for safety
was found to be significantly related to safety behavior (B = .24, SE = .04, p < .001).
Organization-level safety climate was also found to be significantly related to safety
behavior (B = .34, SE = .04, p < .001), showing partial mediation through co-worker
support for safety. The indirect effect was significant (B = .07, SE = .02, CI = .0352 .1248), and accounted for 17.25% of the total effect. The indirect effect shows that for a
one unit increase in organization-level safety climate, safety behavior is expected to
increase .07 units through co-worker support for safety. See Figure 13 for the model with
the significant paths.
Hypothesis 3b, the partial mediating effect of co-worker support for safety on the
relationship between organization-level safety climate and crash outcomes, was also
tested using the PROCESS macro. Organization-level safety climate was found to
significantly predict co-worker support for safety (B = .30, SE = .05, p < .001) and coworker support for safety was found to significantly and positively predict crash
outcomes (B = .57, SE = .29, p = .044). Organization-level safety climate was not
significantly related to crash outcomes (B = .17, SE = .20, p = .385), showing complete
mediation. The indirect effect was found to be significant (B = .17, SE = .10, CI = .0433 .4379). The indirect effect shows that for a one unit increase in organization-level safety
climate the odds of experiencing a crash increases by 1.19 units through co-worker
support for safety. However, it should be noted that the relationship was not in the
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expected direction. Therefore Hypothesis 3b not supported. See Figure 14 for the model
with significant paths.
Hypothesis 4b, positing the partial mediating effect of co-worker support for
safety on the relationship between supervisor-level safety climate and crash outcomes,
was also not supported. Supervisor-level safety climate significantly predicted co-worker
support for safety (B = .34, SE = .05, p < .001) and co-worker support for safety
significantly and positively predicted crashes (B = .67, SE = .29, p = .023). Supervisorlevel safety climate did not predict crash outcomes (B = -0.06, SE = .19, p = .763),
showing complete mediation. The indirect effect was significant (B = .23, SE = .12, CI =
.0657 - .5300). The indirect effect shows that for a one unit increase in supervisor-level
safety climate the odds of experiencing a crash increase by 1.26 units through co-worker
support for safety. However, it should be noted that the effect was not in the expected
direction. Additionally, these results show insignificant suppression. See Figure 15 for
the model with significant paths.
Hypothesis 5a posited that supervisor-level safety climate would partially mediate
the relationship between organization-level safety climate and co-worker support for
safety and was partially supported. Organization-level safety climate was significantly
related to supervisor-level safety climate (B = .81, SE = .03, p < .001) and supervisorlevel safety climate was significantly related to co-worker support for safety (B = .29, SE
= .08, p < .001). Organization-level safety climate was not found to be related to coworker support or safety (B = .06, SE = .08, p = .457), showing complete mediation. The
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indirect effect was significant (B = .24, SE = .09, CI = .0663 - .4302) and accounted for
79.11% of the total effect. See Figure 16 for the model tested.
Hypothesis 5b, the partial mediating effect of supervisor-level safety climate on
the relationship between organization-level safety climate and safety behavior, was tested
using the PROCESS macro. Organization-level safety climate was significantly related to
supervisor-level safety climate (B = .81, SE = .03, p < .001) and supervisor-level safety
climate was significantly related to safety behavior (B = .17, SE = .05, p = .002).
Organization-level safety climate was significantly related to safety behavior (B = .28, SE
= .06, p < .001), showing partial mediation. The indirect effect was found to be
significant (B = .14, SE = .05, CI = .0344 - .2418), and accounted for 33.04% of the total
effect. Therefore, Hypothesis 5b was supported. See Figure 17 for the model tested.
Although no formal hypothesis statement was made about the 3-path mediation
relationship involving organization-level safety climate, supervisor-level safety climate,
co-worker support for safety, and safety behavior, the model was also tested using the
PROCESS macro. Organization-level safety climate was found to be significantly related
to supervisor-level safety climate (B = .81, SE = .03, p < .001) and supervisor-level safety
climate was found to be significantly related to co-worker support for safety (B = .29, SE
= .08, p < .001). Organization-level safety climate was not found to be related to coworker support for safety (B = .06, SE = .08, p = .457). In predicting safety behavior,
organization-level safety climate (B = .25, SE = .05 p < .001), supervisor-level safety
climate (B = .11, SE = .05, p = .041), and co-worker support for safety (B = .22, SE = .04,
p < .001) were all found to be significantly related to safety behavior. The overall indirect

68

effect for the 3-path mediation model was found to be significant (B = .05, SE = .02, CI =
.0141 - .1067) and accounted for 12.84% of the total effect. See Figure 18 for the model
tested.
In a more conservative test of Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b and 5a-b, a test of the 4path mediation model was conducted. Figure 19 shows the model to be tested (which is
the same model as the conceptual model in Figure 2, without the moderation paths),
while Figure 20 shows which paths were found to be significant. Parameter estimates for
the 4-path mediation model are shown in Table 8 and the indirect effects and effect sizes
are included in Table 7. Results of the PROCESS model showed that supervisor-level
safety climate fully mediated the relationship between organization-level safety climate
and co-worker support for safety, partially supporting Hypotheses 5a. Supervisor-level
safety climate also partially mediated the relationship between organization-level safety
climate and safety behavior, supporting Hypothesis 5b.
Co-worker support for safety partially mediated the relationship between
supervisor-level safety climate and safety behavior, supporting Hypothesis 1b. Co-worker
support for safety did not mediate the relationship between organization-level safety
climate and safety behavior, as organization-level safety climate transmitted its effect
through supervisor-level safety climate and a direct effect on safety behavior. Therefore,
in the more conservative model, Hypothesis 2b was not supported. Hypothesis 3b was not
supported as co-worker support for safety did not mediate the relationship between
organization-level safety climate and crashes when controlling for the other variables
entered into the model. Co-worker support for safety also did not mediate the relationship
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between supervisor-level safety climate and crashes, not supporting Hypothesis 4b.
Finally, the four-path, partial mediation from organization-level safety climate to crashes
was found to be significant even though not all paths within the model were significant
(B = .03, SE = .02, CI = .001 - .0905). The indirect effect of the 4-path mediation model
accounted for 8.59% of the total effect. The results of these analyses support the overall
model proposed for the current study.
Incremental effect analyses. Hypothesis 6 posited that co-worker support for
safety would have an incremental effect on safety behavior beyond the effects of
organization- and supervisor-level safety climate. A linear regression was conducted in
steps, controlling for miles driven per year. In model 1, miles driven per year was entered
as the predictor of safety behavior. Miles driven was not found to predict safety behavior
(B = -.000002, SE = .0000000001, p = .250), and was removed from subsequent models.
Next, organization-level safety climate was added to the model and was found to
significantly predict safety behavior (B = .41, SE = .04, p <.001). In the third step,
supervisor-level safety climate was added to the model. Supervisor-level safety climate
was found to significantly predict safety behavior beyond organization-level safety
climate (B = .18, SE = .06, p = .002), and explained and additional 2% of variance in
safety behavior. In the last step, co-worker support for safety was added to the model and
was found to predict an additional 7% variance in safety behavior beyond the variance
explained by both organization- and supervisor-level safety climate (B = .22, SE = .04, p
< .001). Therefore, Hypothesis 6 was supported. Model summary statistics and parameter
estimates can be found in Table 9.
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Outcome difference analyses. Hypothesis 7a and 7b proposed significant
differences in (a) safety behavior, (b) crashes, and lost time injury based on driver type
(i.e., solo versus team drivers). The outcome of lost time injury was not examined due to
lack of variance. In a test of Hypothesis 7a, a linear regression was conducted to
determine if differences in safety behavior exist based on driver type. Results of the
regression revealed that driver type did not predict safety behavior (B = .04, SE = .04, p =
.289). However, co-worker support for safety was significantly related to safety behavior
(B = .34, SE = .04, p < .001), and any differences in safety behavior between the two
groups may depend upon co-worker support. Therefore, the regression equation for
support predicting safety behavior was solved based upon different levels of support (i.e.,
1-5 on the 5-point co-worker support for safety scale) and the predicted values were then
compared to the mean of safety behavior for solo drivers (M = 4.44, SD = 0.65). In order
to determine if the differences between the predicted values and the mean value were
significantly different, a t-test was calculated. The predicted values of the regression
equation revealed that team drivers with support were predicted to have significantly
worse safety behavior than the average safety behavior of solo drivers, until team drivers
received the highest levels of support. Under conditions of extremely high support
(support =5 on a 5-point scale), team drivers were predicted to have significantly better
safety behavior than the average safety behavior of solo drivers (ŷ = 4.58, t = 4.77, p <
.05). Hypothesis 7a was partially supported in that team drivers with the highest level of
support were predicted to have the better safety behavior. See Table 10 for parameter
estimates and predicted values.
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Hypothesis 7b, positing that team drivers with the most support would report the
fewest crashes, was tested first with a logistic regression to determine if there were
significant differences in crashes based on driver type. The results of the logistic
regression revealed that driver type was not predictive of experiencing a crash (B = -0.15,
SE = 0.13, OR = .86, p = .185). However, co-worker support for safety was found to be
significantly related to the outcomes of crashes (B = .64, SE = .28, OR = 1.90, p = .022).
While no differences in the average crashes across groups was found, it is possible
support may explain additional differences between the two groups.
First, the logistic regression equation for driver type predicting crashes was solved
to find the probability of experiencing a crash for solo drivers (OR = .34, probability =
.25) and for team drivers (OR = .29, probability = .22). Next the regression equation for
co-worker support for safety predicting crashes was solved based upon different levels of
support (i.e., 1-5 on the 5-point co-worker support for safety scale) and the predicted
values were then transformed from the logit form to the odds and probabilities and
compared to the average odds and probabilities of solo drivers experiencing a crash.
Contrary to Hypothesis 7b, team drivers were found to be more likely to experience a
crash as the level of support they received increased. However, as support increased to
the highest level, the probability of team drivers experiencing a crash (probabilityteam =
.24) was not different than the average probability of solo drivers experiencing a crash (M
probabilitysolo = .25). Hypothesis 7b was not supported. See Table 11 for parameter
estimates and predicted values.
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Summary
The current study proposed both a moderation and mediation effect of co-worker
support for safety on safety related outcome variables. Hypothesis 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a
regarding the moderating effect of co-worker support for safety on the relationship
between (1a) supervisor-level safety climate and safety behavior, (2a) organization-level
safety climate and safety behavior, (3a) organization-level safety climate and crashes, and
(4a) supervisor-level safety climate and crashes, were not supported.
Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b, regarding the mediating effect of co-worker
support for safety on the relationship between (1b) supervisor-level safety climate and
safety behavior, (2b) organization-level safety climate and safety behavior, (3b)
organization-level safety climate and crashes, and (4b) supervisor-level safety climate
and crashes, were tested along with Hypothesis 5a-b, regarding the mediating effect of
supervisor-level safety climate, in a four-path mediation model. The results of the model
supported Hypothesis 1b, as co-worker support for safety mediated the relationship
between supervisor-level safety climate and safety behavior.
Hypothesis 2b was not supported, as the effect of organization-level safety
climate on safety behavior was transmitted through both supervisor-level safety climate
and co-worker support for safety, in addition to organization-level safety climate having a
direct relationship with safety behavior. Hypothesis 3b and 4b were also not supported as
co-worker support for safety did not mediate the relationship between (3a) organizationlevel safety climate or (4b) supervisor-level safety climate and crashes. Hypothesis 5a
and 5b were partially supported as supervisor-level safety climate did act as a mediator.
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Hypothesis 6 regarding the incremental effect of co-worker support for safety
beyond the effects of both organization- and supervisor-level safety climate was
supported. Finally, Hypotheses 7a and 7b regarding the differences in (a) safety behavior
and (b) crashes for solo vs. team drivers were partially supported. While a direct test of
differences in safety outcomes by group was non-significant, team drivers experiencing
the highest levels of support were predicted to exhibit increased safety behavior over solo
drivers and the probability of team drivers experiencing a crash was also lower than the
probability for solo drivers.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCUSSION
The current study examined the role of co-worker support for safety within the
larger framework of the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes. This
study assessed if co-worker support for safety acts as a moderator and/or mediator of the
safety climate-safety outcome relationship within team truck drivers. While co-worker
support for safety did not appear to act as a moderator in the current study, many of the
mediation hypotheses were supported. The results for each hypothesis are discussed
below, followed by a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the
findings. Study limitations and directions for future study are then addressed.
Discussion of Findings
The first set of hypotheses posited that co-worker support for safety would act as
a moderator and mediator of the relationship between safety climate variables and
subjective and objective safety outcomes. First, the moderation effects of co-worker
support for safety were tested. Co-worker support for safety did not act as a moderator of
the relationship between organization-level safety climate perceptions or supervisor-level
safety climate perceptions and safety behavior or crashes. Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a
were not supported. Although the literature supports the idea that aid or assistance from
co-workers can diminish the relationship between a work demand and safety outcomes
(Turner et al, 2012), the current study was not consistent with these findings.
Additionally, co-worker support for safety did not enhance the positive effects of a
positive safety climate. One explanation for the current findings is that safety climate at
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both the organization and supervisor levels was very high overall. This explanation is
discussed further in the limitations section.
The second part of Hypotheses 1-4 proposed that co-worker support for safety
would act as a mediator of the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes.
Co-worker support for safety was found to act as a partial mediator between supervisorlevel safety climate and safety behavior (H1b) and a complete mediator of the
relationship between supervisor-level safety climate and crashes (H4b). The results
supporting Hypothesis 1b complement previous research by Casey and Krause (2013)
and (Brondino et al, 2012), which showed that co-worker support for safety does mediate
the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes. The current research
indicates that the indirect effect accounts for around 20% of variance of the total effect
(i.e., direct and indirect effect). However, even though complete mediation was found in
the test of Hypothesis 4b, the hypothesis was not supported. The direction of the
relationship between co-worker support for safety and crashes was found to be positive,
such that increases in co-worker support for safety were related to increases in crashes,
contrary to what was expected and to a large majority of safety climate studies. Possible
reasons for this relationship are discussed below.
For Hypotheses 2b and 3b, co-worker support for safety was found to act as a
partial mediator in the relationship between organization-level safety climate and safety
behavior (H2b), and a complete mediator in the relationship between organization-level
safety climate and crashes (H3b). Hypothesis 2b was supported and complements
previous findings by Brondino and colleagues (2012), which found that co-worker safety
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climate mediated the relationship between organization-level safety climate and safety
behavior. Although complete mediation was found, Hypothesis 3b was not supported.
Again, the relationship between support and crashes was found to be opposite of the
hypothesized direction, with increased support for safety being related to increased
crashes.
The unexpected direction of the relationship between co-worker support for safety
and crashes, in addition to the positive correlation between safety behavior and crashes is
inconsistent with past research. Beus and colleagues (2010) did study the causal
relationship between safety climate and injury outcomes meta-analytically. The studies
included measured safety climate and injury at two different points in time, with some
studies measuring safety climate first and injuries at another point in time, or injuries first
and safety climate at another point in time. However, the samples included were varied
and not necessarily similar to the sample in the current study.
The meta-analysis studied the magnitude of the safety climate - injury
relationship and compared it to the magnitude of the injury - safety climate relationship.
Results of the meta-analysis showed that the injury leading to safety climate perceptions
relationship was stronger than the safety climate perceptions leading to injury
relationship. Additionally, the researchers found that the injury leading to safety climate
relationship was not moderated by the length of time between assessments, suggesting
that the length of time between assessments of injuries and safety climate did not matter
and injuries would have an enduring, negative effect on safety climate perceptions.
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Similar reasoning could be applied to the current findings; the experience of a
crash may have an effect on truck drivers’ safety performance behaviors. Experiencing a
crash may lead truck drivers to increase the amount of support they give to their fellow
truck drivers, and may also increase their vigilance when it comes to safety behaviors.
However, it is important to note that Beus et al. did find a negative relationship between
injury and safety climate while the current study found a positive relationship between
co-worker support for safety and crashes. It is possible that the experience of a crash
impacts one’s own behavior (i.e., increasing the support provided to others) more than
one’s perceptions of others’ (i.e., top management and supervisors-level safety climate)
behaviors. This rationale may be a why the current study found a positive relationship
between support and crashes but not a negative relationship between safety climate and
crashes.
The conscientiousness-job performance literature may also be relevant to better
understanding why there was a positive relationship between co-worker support for
safety and crash outcomes. Previous research has shown that the relationship between
conscientiousness and job performance is not always positive (LaHuis, Martin, & Avis,
2005; Le, Oh, Robbins, Ilies, Holland, & Westrick, 2011). In two studies, LaHuis and
colleagues (2005) found that conscientiousness positively predicted job performance for
clerical workers at the low range of conscientiousness levels, but the relationship became
flat and even slightly negative at the higher range of conscientiousness. Le and colleagues
(2011) found similar results as LaHuis and colleagues (2005), but also found that the
point at which the relationship between conscientiousness and job performance became
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flattened or slightly negative differed based on job complexity. The inflection point was
lower for jobs with less job complexity (as operationalized by O*NET).
Truck drivers have relatively low job complexity, possibly marking the inflection
point between support for safety and crash outcomes much earlier than a more complex
job. The results of the conscientiousness studies serve to show that more of a “good
thing” is not necessarily better. While high levels of safety behavior may be seen as
positive, it may be the case that a comparable pattern of results may be found at very high
levels of safety behavior. Truck drivers in the current sample reported, on average, very
high levels of both co-worker support for safety and safety behavior. Therefore, it is
possible that extreme levels of support and safety behavior, the relationship between the
variables and crashes becomes positive.
It is also of note that this unexpected relationship between co-worker support for
safety and crashes is a relatively small relationship. Additionally, the relationship may be
considered unstable. The relationship was only significant when outliers were removed
from the dataset.
Finally, it should be noted that previous research (Probst & Brubaker, 2008) has
found that companies with more positive safety climates engage in far less underreporting
of accidents and injuries than companies with poor or negative safety climates. It is
possible that the high safety climate scores of the current organization, in combination
with high levels of co-worker support for safety, encourage drivers to report all accidents
and injuries, thereby showing a positive relationship between safety behavior/support and
crashes.

79

The second set of hypotheses stated that supervisor-level safety climate would act
as a partial mediator of the relationships between organization-level safety climate and
(H5a) co-worker support for safety and (H5b) safety behavior. Hypothesis 5a was
partially supported; although partial mediation was hypothesized, complete mediation
was found. That is, organization-level safety climate transmitted all of its effects on coworker support for safety through supervisor-level safety climate. Hypothesis 5b was
supported, as supervisor-level safety climate did partially mediate the organization-level
safety climate-safety behavior relationship. The mediating role of supervisor-level safety
climate has previously been hypothesized and shown in research by Zohar and Luria
(2005), who found that group-level (supervisor-level) safety climate fully mediated the
relationship between organization-level safety climate and safety behavior. Additionally,
the view of supervisors as gatekeepers or communicators (Zohar & Luria, 2010; Huang et
al., under review) of the safety message within an organization also support the findings
that supervisor-level safety climate can transmit the safety message from higher levels
within the organization to lower levels.
Although not specifically hypothesized, more conservative models of the first and
second set of hypotheses were conducted. Tests of both a 3-path and a 4-path mediation
model were performed. The 3-path mediation from organization-level safety climate to
safety behavior and the 4-path mediation from organization-level safety climate to
crashes were both found to be significant. The 3-path mediation model directly links
organization-level safety climate to safety behavior, but also shows that much of the
effect of organization-level safety climate is exerted through supervisor-level safety
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climate and co-worker support for safety. Additionally, the 3-path mediation model also
shows that while supervisor-level safety climate has a small, direct relationship with
safety behavior, co-worker support for safety accounts for a large percent of the overall
relationship. These results show that research that neglects the role of co-workers in
disseminating and passing on the safety message is not studying the full relationship
between safety climate and safety related outcomes. For example, if implemented safety
climate interventions directed at the company and supervisors are not showing the
expected changes in safety outcomes, it is possible the message is being altered by other
employees.
The 4-path mediation model, which built on the 3-path mediation model and
included crashes as the final outcome variable, shows many of the same results as the 3path model. While none of the paths to crashes were significant, the indirect effect of the
overall 4-path model is significant, showing that strong relationships in the model can
make up for the marginal relationships (when the over variables within the model are
controlled for) between co-worker support for safety and safety behavior leading to
crashes. This significant indirect effect does show that the 4-path partial mediation is
significant. However, it should be noted that in this more conservative model, Hypothesis
1b, the partial mediation of co-worker support for safety on the relationship between
organization-level safety climate and safety behavior, is no longer significant. These
results occur because both the 3-path and 4-path mediation models control for the
mediating effect of supervisor-level safety climate, which fully mediated the relationship
between organization-level safety climate and co-worker support for safety. These path
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models show how important it is to consider the entire model together and not just
relationships considered in isolation. Additionally, these results have implications for
future safety climate research. It is important for researchers to measure safety climate
perceptions at multiple points of reference and to include variables related to co-workers
so that all relationships between the variables can be tested and practical assumptions are
not made based on findings that change when other variables are accounted for (as was
the case with Hypothesis 2b).
The last sets of hypotheses involved the incremental effect of co-worker support
for safety and the differences in safety outcomes for solo vs. team truck drivers. In testing
the incremental effect of co-worker support for safety beyond organization- and
supervisor-level safety climate on safety behavior, Hypothesis 6 was supported.
Organization-level safety climate accounted for 28% of the variance in safety behavior.
Adding supervisor-level safety climate to the model resulted in an addition 2% of
variance explained, beyond the variance explained by organization-level safety climate.
Finally, adding co-worker support to the model resulted in an additional 7% of variance
explained in safety behavior, beyond both organization- and supervisor-level safety
climate. These results complement previous findings about the importance of general coworker support beyond supervisor support (Chiaburu & Harrison, 2008) and specifically,
the importance of co-worker support for safety (Turner et al, 2010). These results show
that it not only matters what message supervisors and top managers are sending about
safety, the safety message of co-workers can also be of considerable consequence. That
is, all measured sources of the safety message are important and have an impact on
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employee safety behavior, so all sources should be taken into consideration when
planning safety interventions.
The final two hypotheses sated that differences exist in the (H7a) safety behavior
and (H7b) crash outcomes of solo vs. team truck drivers, with team truck drivers
expected to report increased levels of safety behavior and the lowest levels of crashes.
Straight-forward tests of these hypotheses indicated that there were no significant
differences in the average safety behavior and crashes reported by the two groups.
However, because co-worker support for safety was found to be significantly related to
both safety behavior and crashes, predicted values at different levels of support were
compared to the average safety behavior and crash scores of solo truck drivers. Results
revealed that team truck drivers with low through about average reported significantly
worse safety behavior than solo truck drivers. However, at the highest level of support,
team truck drivers reported significantly better safety behavior than solo truck drivers.
Therefore, Hypothesis 7a was partially supported.
Additional comparisons of the expected probabilities for experiencing a crash
showed that at low levels of support, team truck drivers were expected to experience
fewer crashes than solo drivers. As support increased for the team truck drivers, so did
the expected probabilities of experiencing a crash, until at the highest level of support,
where there was little difference in the expected probabilities of crashes for the two
groups. These second sets of comparisons are contrary to the expected findings, in that
increased support was related to an increased probability of crashes. These findings show
in more detail the issues examined in the discussion of Hypothesis 3b and 4b. It is

83

possible a reverse causal relationship between support and crashes is producing the
contrary findings.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
The current study examined how co-worker support for safety affects the
relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes. Although none of the
moderation hypotheses were supported, many of the mediation hypotheses were
supported. These findings highlight the important and often overlooked role of employees
themselves in influencing the safety performance of their fellow co-workers. For
example, safety climate research focuses almost exclusively on models of the safety
climate-safety outcome relationship that do not include any variables related to coworkers (e.g., Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2006; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Zohar & Luria,
2010). Additionally, studies that have examined co-worker support for safety (e.g.,
Tucker et al., 2008; Morrow et al., 2010; Turner et al., 2010; Casey & Krauss, 2013)
tended not to include safety climate as a predictor of the safety outcomes studied, but
rather include either facets of safety climate (e.g., management support for safety) or
other support constructs (e.g., general supervisor support).
Additionally, the current study provided a replication of previous findings of the
mediating role of supervisor-level safety climate on the relationship between
organization-level safety climate and safety related outcomes. Although it is known that
employees can form separate safety climate perceptions with the organization and
supervisor as referents, and is often described that way, it is not often that more than one
level of safety climate is used as a predictor in a study and less often that mediation from
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one level to another is included. Zohar and Luria (2005) tested a model of safety climate
that included referents to climate perceptions at both the organization and group
(supervisor) level and found that supervisor-level safety climate fully mediated the
relationship between organization-level safety climate and safety behavior. The current
study supports these findings and has also shown that supervisor-level safety climate can
fully and partially mediate relationships between organization-level safety climate and
safety related outcomes. Therefore, the current study has added important information to
the general safety climate model.
Finally, the current study extends the remote worker literature with regard to
safety and the influence of other employees working nearby. The Health and Safety
Executive of the United Kingdom (HSE) has stated that those employees who work by
themselves or away from close supervision are more vulnerable than those employees
who work in a traditional environment (HSE, 2015). The current study has shown,
through comparing the safety behavior and cash outcomes of solo and team drivers, that
at the highest levels of support, team drivers report significantly increased safety
behaviors over the average reported by solo drivers. However, these same analyses
reveled that at lower-to-average levels of support, team drivers report significantly lower
safety behavior than the average reported by solo drivers. These results are equivocal;
having a teammate present can be harmful except in cases where the teammate provides
extremely high support for safety. Therefore, we can see that the act of simply having
another person present during work is not necessarily a protective factor.
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In terms of practical implications, the current findings show that safety climate
interventions aimed simply at top management or supervisors may be insufficient to
produce lasting effects on the safety outcomes of an organization. The current study
found that not only do co-workers transmit the safety message from higher levels within
the organization, but co-worker support also has a relationship with employee safety
behavior beyond the effects of both the organization and supervisors. Though the current
study found an unexpected positive association between safety behavior and crashes,
previous literature endorses the negative relationship between safety behavior and
accidents (e.g., Neal & Griffin 2004; 2006). Therefore, interventions aimed at decreasing
accidents and injuries should also include education for employees to support their fellow
co-workers in addition to strategies aimed at top management and supervisors.
Additionally, companies may be able to look to interventions designed to increase
co-worker support for safety if previous safety climate interventions have not been
successful. That is, while the onus for safe working conditions and policies lies with the
company, the current study shows that co-workers can and do have a relationship with
safety behavior. Measuring constructs such as co-worker support for safety and coworker safety climate over time may help companies see where improvements are
needed.
Limitations and Future Directions
Despite the contributions made by the current study, there are some limitations
that should be addressed in future research. First, the current study utilized a sample of
team truck drivers, which may limit the generalizability of the findings. Team truck
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driving is a unique occupation, even among truck drivers and other lone workers. For
example, in an occupation where more time is spent as part of a work group the
moderating effect of co-worker support for safety may be more in-line with findings in
the support literature. Additionally, the moderating effect of co-worker support for safety
may be more important in more high-stress occupations (e.g., trauma nurses). Therefore,
the models tested in the current study should be replicated in many different occupations.
Next, the unexpected relationships found between safety behavior, co-worker
support for safety, and crashes may be due to a methodological flaw. Co-worker support
for safety may appear to be positively related to crashes because experiencing a crash is a
sensitizing event. It is possible that experiencing a crash during the six months after the
survey was completed is related to experiencing a prior crash. Experiencing a prior crash
may then make the driver more aware of both their own safety behaviors and the
behaviors of their team driver, causing the driver to offer more safety related support. The
relationship between co-worker support for safety and crashes observed in the current
study may actually be part of a feedback loop. The design of the current study does not
allow for testing a model which would control for previous crashes and the resulting
changes in safety behavior and co-worker support for safety over time. A future study
could collect both predictor and outcome data at three or more time points in order to test
the longitudinal relationships between the variables. If data were collected longitudinally,
hierarchical linear modeling techniques could be used to account for the within and
between person effects of experiencing a crash on co-worker support. It is likely that the
within person effects would show that as a person experienced a crash and changed their
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behaviors, future accidents would decrease and the relationship between co-worker
support and crashes would be negative. However, when looking at the between person
effects, as is the case in the current study, crashes are likely to remain a sensitizing event
and the relationship between co-worker support and crashes may remain positive.
Future research should also assess disruptive or counter-productive to safety
behaviors of co-workers. The current study found that solo drivers (who do not
experience co-worker support for safety) report higher safety behavior on average than
team drivers with low levels of support. However, the study did not assess if low levels of
support are related to co-worker behaviors that would cause the driver to engage in
unsafe behaviors, which may explain the lower safety behavior scores.
The time frame for collecting data may also need to be varied. Recent research
has shown that safety climate may have a “shelf life” as short as three months as a
predictor of severe incidents (Bergman, Payne, Taylor, & Beus, 2014). If safety climate
can become a less powerful predictor of accident outcomes over time, then it is also
possible that safety behavior or co-worker support for safety may also become less
powerful in predicting outcomes. However, because both safety behavior and co-worker
support for safety are more proximal predictors of accident outcomes than safety climate,
it is possible they will remain relevant predictors for a longer period of time.
Another concern in the current study may be that the means for safety climate,
safety behavior, and co-worker support for safety were all at the upper end of the 5-point
scale on which they were measured. However, the high means may be artificially inflated
due to socially desirable responding. The survey was administered at the end of a
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company training program and in order to participate, drivers had to click a link and be
moved to a survey site not associated with the company. However, even though it was
stated that the survey had no link to the trucking company, drivers who participated may
have assumed their responses would somehow be available to the company and distorted
their responses to be more favorable. Even if the drivers did understand that their survey
answers were in no way available to the company, research on socially desirable
responding shows that participants engage in impression management even when only
strangers are present (Mick, 1996). These findings mean that the drivers’ answers would
still be distorted because it is understood that higher safety climate is better, as is
engaging in supportive behaviors with one’s team mate. However, the current study did
find significant relationships between study variables, which may indicate that social
desirability may not be a substantial issue. Another explanation for the high scores on the
safety climate, co-worker support for safety, and safety behavior scales may be that they
are in fact true scores and are the result of a safe and safety conscious company.
An additional limitation faced by the current study is that team drivers could not
be matched with their driver teammates. If drivers were able to be matched, it would have
provided the potential for dyadic or hierarchical analysis of the measured variables.
Future research would be strengthened if drivers could be matched with their teammate.
In terms of assigning a causal link between study variables, it should be noted that
all variables except crash outcomes were collected at the same time and are considered
cross-sectional. As with all cross-sectional data, causal relationships cannot be assumed.
As mentioned above, future research should collect data at multiple time points to test for
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causality. However, the majority of the relationships found in the current study do
support the findings of past research, which has been conducted with longitudinal data.
Next, the outcome of crashes, while not necessarily an infrequent occurrence in
the current sample with 22% experiencing a crash, can still be considered a low base rate
occurrence. A larger sample may have provided additional data points for the outcome of
crashes. Additionally, the outcome of lost time due to injury was not able to be analyzed
in the current study because only three participants reported time away from work. In a
much larger sample, it is likely more participants would report days away from work and
the variable could be used as a proxy of injury severity.
It is also important to recall that not all crashes experienced by the sample are the
fault of the driver. Therefore, additional error exists in the outcome of crashes within the
current study. In future studies, it would be ideal to be able to differentiate between
crashes where the truck was at fault and those where the driver was not at fault. However,
even when an accident may not be deemed to be the fault of the truck driver, it does not
necessarily mean the truck driver did not engage in an unsafe behavior.
Conclusion
This study examined the role of co-worker support for safety within the wider
safety climate-safety outcome model. Co-worker support for safety is an important
construct to study because current models of safety climate neglect to consistently
consider the influence of other employees who work with and around a given employee.
While the current study did not show that co-worker support for safety acts as a buffer for
negative safety climate, results did show that co-worker support for safety is a mediator
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of the effect of safety climate variables on safety behavior and that co-worker support for
safety accounts for additional variance in safety behavior beyond organization- and
supervisor-level safety climate. I encourage the research community to pay additional
attention to the role of co-workers within the broader safety climate model so that the
health and safety of all workers may be continuously improved.
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Appendix A
Measures of Safety Climate
Organization-level Safety Climate Measure and Sub-dimensions
Proactive Practices.
Uses any available information to improve existing safety rules
Tries to continually improve safety levels in each department
Invests a lot in safety training for workers
Creates programs to improve drivers’ health and wellness (e.g., diet, exercise)
Listens carefully to our ideas about improving safety
Cares more about my safety than on-time delivery
Allows drivers to change their schedules when they are getting too tired
Provides enough hands-on training to help new drivers be safe
Gives safety a higher priority compared to other truck companies
Reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about safety concerns
Is strict about working safely when delivery falls behind schedule
Gives drivers enough time to deliver loads safely
Fixes truck/equipment problems in a timely manner
Driver Safety Priority.
Will overlook log discrepancies if I deliver on time
Makes it clear that, regardless of safety, I must pick up/deliver on time
*Expects me to sometimes bend safety rules for important customers
*Turns a blind eye when we use hand-held cell phones while driving
Supervisory Care Promotion.
*Assigns too many drivers to each supervisor, making it hard for us to get help
*Hires supervisors who don’t care about drivers
*Turns a blind eye when a supervisor bends some safety rules
Supervisor-level Safety Climate Measure and Sub-dimensions
Safety Promotion.
Compliments employees who pay special attention to safety
Provides me with feedback to improve my safety performance
Respects me as a professional driver
Frequently talks about safety issues throughout the work week
Discusses with us how to improve safety
Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to act safely
Is supportive if I ask for help with personal problems or issues
Is an effective mediator/trouble-shooter between the customer and me
Is strict about working safely even when we are tired or stressed
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Gives higher priority to my safety than on-time delivery
Would like me to take care of serious equipment problems first before delivering
Gives me the freedom to change my schedule when I see safety problems
*Makes me feel like I’m bothering him/her when I call
Delivery Limits.
*Encourages us to go faster when deadheading (going for a new load)
*Expects me to sometimes bend driving safety rules for important customers
*Sometimes turns a blind eye with rules when deliveries fall behind schedule
*Pushes me to keep driving even when I call in to say I feel too sick or tired
Cell Phone Disapproval.
*Expects me to answer the cell phone even while I’m driving
Stops talking to me on the phone if he/she hears that I am driving
*Turns a blind eye when we use hand-held cell phones while driving
* Denotes a reverse-scored item.
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Appendix B
Measure of Co-Worker Support for Safety
Instructions: If you are currently a team driver, please answer the following questions
about your [Company] teammate. If you are NOT a team driver, please choose “not
applicable”.
Strongly disagree / disagree / neutral/ agree / Strongly agree / Not applicable
My teammate is ready to talk to me when I fail to use safety equipment/procedures.
My teammate is prepared to stop me from working dangerously.
My teammate encourages me to work safely.
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Appendix C
Measure of Safety Behavior
I always comply with the posted speed limits
*I occasionally jump to get out of my truck quickly
*I occasionally drive without getting enough sleep
*I sometimes find myself in a difficult situation without having a way out
I always use my log book legally
*When I’m tired or rushed, I some- times skip the daily vehicle inspection
* Denotes a reverse-scored item.
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Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for Team Truck Drivers
Variable
1. OSC
2. GSC
3. PCSS
4. Safety
Behavior
5. Crash
6. Miles
Driven per
Year

M
4.24
4.10
4.66

SD
0.78
0.75
0.76

1
(.94)
0.79**
0.30**

2

3

4

5

(.96)
0.35**

(0.96)

4.47
0.22

0.58
0.42

0.54**
0.08

0.51**
0.03

0.44**
0.13*

(.69)
0.11*

-

22,954

9,912

-0.10

-0.10

-0.11

-0.06

0.01

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Values on the diagonal are Cronbach’s alpha values for each scale. Sample
sizes ranged from 326 to 364. Crash is a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates a "yes" response and 0
indicates a "no" response. OSC = organization-level safety climate. GSC = supervisor-level safety
climate. PCSS = co-worker support for safety
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Table 2
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for Solo Truck Drivers
Variable
1. OSC
2. GSC
3. Safety
Behavior
4. Crash
5. Miles
Driven per
Year

M
4.08
4.22

SD
0.69
0.72

1
(.92)
.77**

2

3

4

(.94)

4.44
0.25

0.65
0.44

.51**
0.03

.54**
0.02

(.76)
.04*

-

19,983.28

10,594.52

0.01

0.03

-0.0002

.05**

5

-

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Values on the diagonal are Cronbach’s alpha values for each scale. Sample
sizes ranged from 3,038 to 3,717. Crash is a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates a "yes" response and
0 indicates a "no" response. OSC = organization-level safety climate. GSC = supervisor-level safety
climate.
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Table 3
Model summary and parameter estimates interaction between supervisor-level safety
climate and co-worker support predicting safety behavior.
Model
1

R
0.58

R2
0.33

Adj. R2
0.33

Std. Error
0.48

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

Parameter
estimates
for the 	
  interaction between
supervisor-level
safety
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
   climate and	
   coworker support for safety predicting safety behavior.
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Table 4
Model summary and parameter estimates interaction between organization-level safety
climate and co-worker support predicting safety behavior.
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Table 5
Parameter estimates of the interaction between organization-level safety climate and co-worker support for safety predicting
crashes in a logistic regression
95% CI for Odds Ratio
Predictor
Constant
Miles
OSC
PCSS
OSC*PCSS

B

SE

Δχ2	
  removal

Odds Ratio

Lower

Upper

-1.58
5.36E-06
0.30
0.50
-0.55

0.37
7.10E-06
0.21
0.28
0.4

-0.58
2.15
4.24*
2.03

-1.00
1.36
1.65
0.58

-1.00
0.90
0.96
0.27

-1.00
2.05
2.85
1.26

Note. * p < .05, Model χ2 = 325.40, df = 4, n = 326, R2L = 0.03. Initial -2 Log Likelihood (2LL) = 336.53, Model -2 LL with predictors = 11.12. OSC = organization-level safety
climate. PCSS = perceived co-worker support for safety. Miles driven = miles driven per year
and is included as a control variable. DV = crashes.
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Table 6
Parameter estimates of the interaction between supervisor-level safety climate and co-worker support for safety predicting
crashes in a logistic regression
95% CI for Odds Ratio
Predictor
Constant
Miles
GSC
PCSS
GSC*PCSS

B

SE

-1.52
4.69E-06
0.07
0.51
-0.66

0.37
7.14E-06
0.21
0.28
0.4

Δχ

2	
  

removal

-0.44
0.13
4.13*
3.05

Odds Ratio

Lower

Upper

-1.00
1.08
1.66
0.52

-1.00
0.72
0.96
0.24

-1.00
1.61
2.87
1.14

Note. * p < .05, Model χ2 = 325.43, df = 4, n = 326, R2L = 0.03. Initial -2 Log Likelihood (2LL) = 336.53, Model -2 LL with predictors = 11.09. GSC = organization-level safety
climate. PCSS = perceived co-worker support for safety. Miles driven = miles driven per year
and is included as a control variable. DV = crashes.
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Table 7
Indirect effects and effect sizes for hypothesized path models

Hypothesis

Path

Indirect
Effect

Boot St.
Error

CI

Effect
Size

1b

GSC → PCSS → Safety
Behavior

0.0783

0.0241

.0399 - .1336

0.2037

2b

OSC → PCSS → Safety
Behavior

0.0707

0.0227

.0352 - .1248

0.1724

3b

OSC → PCSS → Crash

0.1720

0.1038

.0433 - .4379

0.5552

4b

GSC → PCSS → Crash

0.2280

0.1237

.0657 - .5300

-

5a

OSC → GSC → PCSS

0.2368

0.0933

.0663 - .4302

0.7911

5b

OSC → GSC → Safety
Behavior

0.1373

0.0529

.0344 - .2418

0.3304

-

OSC → GSC → PCSS →
Safety Behavior

0.0526

0.0238

.0141 - .1067

0.1283

-

OSC → GSC → PCSS →
Safety Behavior → Crash

0.0266

0.0222

.0001 - .0905

0.0859

Note. The indirect effects, standard errors, and confidence intervals presented were obtained through
5,000 bootstrapped samples. The effect size is the proportion of the total effect accounted for by the
indirect effect. CI = confidence interval. OSC = organization-level safety climate. GSC = supervisorlevel safety climate. PCSS = co-worker support for safety.
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Table 8
Model summary and parameter estimates for 4-path mediation analysis
Model
1
2

R
0.79
0.35

R2
0.63
0.12

MSE
0.22
0.51

F
560.4
23.27

df1
1
2

df2
336
335

Sig.
<.001
<.001

3

0.61

0.37

0.22

66.23

3

334

<.001

Model
4

-2LL
334.44

Model LL
13.05

n
338

B

Std. Error

t-value

Sig.

0.003
0.81

0.03
0.03

0.14
23.67

0.888
<.001

0.02
0.29
0.06

0.04
0.08
0.08

0.42
3.56
0.74

0.675
<.001
0.457

-0.01
0.22
0.11
0.25

0.03
0.04
0.06
0.05
Std. Error

-0.28
6.23
2.05
4.6
Z-value

0.782
0.005
0.041
<.001
Sig.

Parameter
Model
DV = GSC
1
Intercept
OSC
DV = PCSS
2
Intercept
GSC
OSC
DV = Safety Behavior
3
Intercept
PCSS
GSC
OSC
DV = Crashes

B
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4

Intercept
Safety
Behavior
PCSS
GSC
OSC

-1.42

0.15

-9.63

<.001

0.51

0.34

1.51

0.131

0.51
-0.53
0.44

0.29
0.31
0.33

1.73
-1.68
1.33

0.084
0.092
0.183

Note. Model 4 included a dichotomous outcome and logistic regression was used. OSC = organization-level safety climate.
GSC = supervisor-level safety climate. PCSS = perceived co-worker support for safety. Miles = miles driven per year.
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Table 9
Model summary and parameter estimates predicting safety behavior
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Table 9 continued
Parameter estimates for organization-level safety climate, supervisor-level safety climate, and perceived co-worker support for
safety predicting safety behavior

Model
1

Parameter

B

Std. Error

β

t-value

p-value

Intercept
4.55
0.08
57.47
<.001
Miles
-0.000002
1E-10
-0.60
-1.15
0.25
2
Intercept
4.47
0.03
165.40
<.001
OSC
0.41
0.04
0.53
11.42
<.001
Intercept
4.47
0.03
167.53
<.001
3
OSC
0.27
0.06
0.34
4.61
<.001
GSC
0.18
0.06
0.23
3.13
0.002
Intercept
4.47
0.03
176.55
<.001
4
OSC
0.25
0.06
0.33
4.60
<.001
GSC
0.11
0.06
0.15
2.05
0.041
PCSS
0.22
0.04
0.29
6.23
<.001
Note. Miles = miles driven per year. OSC - organization-level safety climate. GSC =
supervisor-level safety climate. PCSS = perceived co-worker support for safety. DV = safety
behavior.
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Table 10
Parameter estimates for driver type predicting safety behavior
Predictor
Constant
Driver
Type

B
4.401

St. Error
0.04

Sig.
<.001

0.037

0.035

0.298

Parameter estimates for co-worker support for safety predicting safety behavior
Predictor
Constant
PCSS

B
2.899
0.337

St. Error
0.179
0.038

Sig.
<.001
<.001

Predicted values for co-worker support predicting safety behavior
Level of
Support (x)
1
2
3
4
5

Outcome
(y)
3.236
3.573
3.91
4.247
4.584

df
336
336
336
336
336

t-value
-39.27*
-28.26*
-17.25*
-6.24*
4.77*

109

Table 11
Parameter estimates for driver type predicting crash outcome
Variable
Constant
Driver
Type

B
-1.079

St. Error
0.04

Sig.
<.001

-0.148

0.13

0.185

Predicted values of crash outcomes by driver type
Predicted Crash Outcome by Driver Type
Logit
Odds
Probability
Solo
-1.08
0.34
0.25
Team
-1.25
0.29
0.22
Parameter estimates and predicted values for co-worker support predicting crashes
Variable
Constant
PCSS

B
-4.37
0.64

St. Error
1.36
0.28

Sig.
0.001
0.022

Predicted values for co-worker support predicting crash outcomes
Predicted Crash Outcome by Levels of Support for
Team Drivers
Levels of
Support (X)
1
2
3
4
5

Logit
-3.73
-3.09
-2.45
-1.81
-1.17

Odds
0.02
0.05
0.09
0.16
0.31

Probability
0.02
0.04
0.08
0.14
0.24
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Figure 1. Base model.

Note. OSC = organization-level safety climate. GSC = supervisor-level safety climate.
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Figure 2. Conceptual model.

Note. OSC = organization-level safety climate; GSC = supervisor-level safety climate;
PCSS = perceived co-worker support for safety.
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Figure 3. Co-worker support for safety as a moderator of the relationship between
supervisor-level safety climate and safety behavior.

Note. GSC = supervisor-level safety climate; PCSS = perceived co-worker support for
safety.
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Figure 4. Co-worker support for safety as a partial mediator of the relationship between
supervisor-level safety climate and safety behavior.

Note. GSC = supervisor-level safety climate; PCSS = perceived co-worker support for
safety.
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Figure 5. Co-worker support for safety as a moderator of the relationship between
organization-level safety climate and safety behavior.

Note. OSC = organization-level safety climate; PCSS = perceived co-worker support for
safety.
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Figure 6. Co-worker support for safety as a partial mediator of the relationship between
organization-level safety climate and safety behavior.

Note. OSC = organization-level safety climate; PCSS = perceived co-worker support for
safety.
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Figure 7. Co-worker support for safety as a moderator of the relationship between
organization-level safety climate and crashes.

Note. OSC = organization-level safety climate; PCSS = perceived co-worker support for
safety.
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Figure 8. Co-worker support for safety as a partial mediator of the relationship between
organization-level safety climate and crashes.

Note. OSC = organization-level safety climate; PCSS = perceived co-worker support for
safety.
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Figure 9. Co-worker support for safety as a moderator of the relationship between
supervisor-level safety climate and crashes.

Note. GSC = supervisor-level safety climate; PCSS = perceived co-worker support for
safety.
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Figure 10. Co-worker support for safety as a partial mediator of the relationship between
supervisor-level safety climate and crashes.

Note. GSC = supervisor-level safety climate; PCSS = perceived co-worker support for
safety.

121

Figure 11. The incremental effect of co-worker support for safety beyond organizationand supervisor-level safety climate.

Note. OSC = organization-level safety climate; GSC = supervisor-level safety climate;
PCSS = perceived co-worker support for safety.
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Figure 12. Model and unstandardized path coefficients for mediation effect of co-worker
support for safety on the relationship between supervisor-level safety climate and safety
behavior.
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Figure 13. Model and unstandardized path coefficients for mediation effect of co-worker
support for safety on the relationship between organization-level safety climate and
safety behavior.
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Figure 14. Model and unstandardized path coefficients for mediation effect of co-worker
support for safety on the relationship between organization-level safety climate and crash
outcomes.
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Figure 15. Model and unstandardized path coefficients for mediation effect of co-worker
support for safety on the relationship between supervisor-level safety climate and crash
outcomes.
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Figure 16. Model and unstandardized path coefficients for mediation effect of
supervisor-level safety climate on the relationship between organization-level safety
climate and co-worker support for safety.
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Figure 17. Model and unstandardized path coefficients for mediation effect of supervisorlevel safety climate on the relationship between organization-level safety climate and
safety behavior.
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Figure 18. Model and unstandardized path coefficients for 3-path mediation model
linking organization-level safety climate to safety behavior.
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Figure 19. Four-path mediation model tested with PROCESS macro.
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Figure 20. Results of mediation analyses with PROCESS macro. All non-significant
paths have been removed from the model. All coefficients are unstandardized.
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